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**Prof.Dr. Kadum AL – Adlly**

**Specialization/Psychological Measurement**

**009647703429069**

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- 5-

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- .All appendices are mentioned at the end of the paper after references.

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**Prof. Dr. Kadum al-Addly**

**Editor-in-chief of the Journal of Northern Europe Academy for Studies & Research**

**In the name of Allah the Merciful**

Praise is to God for His great bounties and thanks to Him for His generous giving, He has blessed us with success and facilitation.

He honored us with a piercing vision to move towards our goals, vision and mission, , And here we present to the dear reader ,the sixteenth issue of the Refereed Northern European Academic Journal , which represents the fourth quarter From the fourth year. The base of researchers who wish to publish their research in the journal has expanded. Journal's relations have also grown and expanded, and the fields of approving its contents and re-publishing them within prestigious international scientific containers have also expanded. The journal has achieved many indirect successes through the adoption of many research papers published in it for scientific promotions in many Arab universities.

The Arab and international influence coefficient obtained by it has risen, and we still have a lot to accomplish, and the work is underway with great vigor towards that. Everything that has been achieved we would not have achieved without the confidence of the researchers and the enthusiasm of the editorial board and the advisory body.

To all of us, our thanks and appreciation, and in conclusion, we ask God Almighty to grant us strength and to overcome difficulties.

In order to provide readers and researchers with a reliable and reliable scientific reference. God bless editor.

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**NO. 16**

**Poem of Abu Hayyan al-Andalusi (d: 745 AH) in the  
lamentableness of his wife Zumurud- Technical  
- Analytical Study -**

**Prepared by**



**A.Prof.Dr. Amer Mahmood Rabei  
Jerash University/Jordan  
[Dr.amer5rabie@yahoo.com](mailto:Dr.amer5rabie@yahoo.com)**

**Abstract:**

This study provides an artistic and analytical reading of the Poem of Abu Hayyan al-Andalusi in the lamentableness of his wife Zumurud, highlighting the sacred relationship, the intimate bond that brought them together, and the accompanying relationship: a free and honest passion, a sweetness often, and tayeb Ma'ashar, and what has manifested in his poem of body lamentation: the distressed soul, the inflamed sensations, the cherished memories, the feelings of the passionate lover, and what was broadcast in them-also-of: a fondness, a passion, and a sadness, all characterized by the quality of the formulation, the sincerity of the passion, its heat and its power.

The objective, importance, justification for its selection, and methodology of this study were all explained. The first theme in this poem deals with the aesthetics of content. In this poem, the second theme also came to a halt at the aesthetic of the form. The study's most noteworthy findings were summarized in a conclusion. After that, there was a list of sources and references from which it drew.

**Keywords:** Lamentation, content, form, Abu Hayyan Al-Andalusi, Zumurud, Andalusian poetry.

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Some negative phenomena in Iraqi society after 2003 and their damage to societal values

**A study of some negative phenomena in Iraqi society after 2003 and  
their damage to societal values**

**Prepared by**



**A. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Al-Jubouri**  
**Social Psychology**  
**Northern European Academy**  
[Mfss64@yahoo.dk](mailto:Mfss64@yahoo.dk)



**Dr. Zainab Hashem Jrian**  
**Department of History**  
**Wasit University - College of Basic  
\_Education**

(tal values

## **Abstract**

There are a lot of extraneous phenomena in the system of values and morals of Iraqi society, In fact, it was only a natural result of the loss of the prestige of the state and the rule of law as a result of the administrative corruption that has spread in the Iraqi body since the beginning of the occupation in 2003 until the present day, When the government turns away from performing its duties towards society and its officials are busy with different positions by stealing and looting public money, administrative corruption in Iraq is unique in its kind, Corruption is unparalleled in the entire world, What the Iraqi society has suffered from the repercussions of the occupation and the absence of the government's role has led to the loss of societal values and the entry of foreign values into it, this is what we will address in this study, which is to shed light on some negative phenomena of the Iraqi society and their impact on the behavioral values of the society.

**Keywords:** negative phenomenon, society, administrative corruption, social phenomenon

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**The Effectiveness of Spiritual Intelligence and Mental Flexibility on  
The Students of Universities**

**Prepared by**



**A.Prof.Dr. Zaheah Saleh Zaitoun**  
College of Education, Al-Kharj, Department of  
Psychology  
Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University  
[z.zaitoun@psau.edu.sa](mailto:z.zaitoun@psau.edu.sa)

## **Abstract**

The aim of this study is to clarify the spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility definitions on the university students under specific variables, to context the border of each one alone, and then determine the relations between both. Four variables that were used in the study, each one had two directions as; collage (literary, scientific), study level (fourth, seventh), gender (male, female), and social status (married, single). The sample was inserted in the study from Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University Saudi Arabia and contains 242 students. The result showed that the level of mental flexibility for the students was high where the spiritual intelligence was medium. Also, there was a strong positive correlation coefficient between spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility. Mental flexibility depending on an academic level but did not for the other variables. However, spiritual intelligence not affected through changing variables.

**Key words:** Spiritual intelligence, Mental flexibility.

## **Introduction:**

One of the relatively modern concepts that started to appear recently is spiritual intelligence (SI). The most impressive definition for spiritual intelligence started from Nasel (2004) who defined SI as the ability of an individual to employ spiritual talents to know more, looking for vague meaning and analyzing the existential, spiritual, and functional issues (Hosseini et al, 2010). Other researchers defined spiritual intelligence as the basis for individuals to construct the capacity of forgiveness and modification to any life case in the most successful way (Rani et al., 2013). Also, spiritual skills are used by the individual to take an important decision, thinking about existential issues, and then trying to fix daily problems (Moati et al., 2018). SI specified by Amram and Dryer (2008) “It is the ability to apply, manifest, and embody spiritual resources values, and qualities to enhance daily functioning and wellbeing.” For Vaughan (2002) the description of him about SI “It is interested with the inner life of mind and spirit and its relationship to being in the world.” (Zohar and Marshall 2000) defined SI as the capability of human to solve issues of meaning and values in human life. The most comprehensive definition by Arnout (2016, p.5) who defined SI as “the center and source of guidance for the other

intelligences of the individual, and represents an umbrella that combines spiritual vigilance, spiritual capacity, and spiritual presence, and represents the compass that helps the individual to navigate the sea of life with joy, wisdom, mercy, and optimism, In the mercy of life here and now.”

Many kinds of research applied in different fields to check the potential of spiritual intelligence on all kinds of age such as unemployed adults to predict well-being (Arnout, 2020). And on employed artists (Behroozi et al., 2014). Also, one study takes genders (men and women) in marital status (Rostami, 2014). Other findings relations between depression and spiritual intelligence among older adults (60 years and above) (Roy et al, 2021). The other study by how much gender (male and female) and education background (arts and science) could be affected mental health and spiritual intelligence (Pant and Srivastava, 2019). Other study the potential of spiritual intelligence on the traits of personality the sample is taken from different faculties from Jordanian university included male and female (Mahasneh et al., 2015).

The researcher tries to crystalize the concept of mental flexibility from previous research (Matthew and Stemler, 2008) defined mental flexibility (MF) as solving created problems using gained knowledge through using both thinking divergent and convergent. Other defined (MF) the ability of an individual to adapt with ambiance by synchronizing between the environment changes and updating responses stands on cognitive knowledge and behavioral experience (Armbruster et al., 2012; Dajani, and Uddin, 2015; Pang et al., 2016).

To study the mental flexibility, researchers consider many references as basic to apply their study on as; the level of education, the gender, language, age for adult, ethnic origins (Matthew and Stemler, 2013), children (8-15 years) (Mogadam et al., 2018) and woman (63-80 years) to check mental flexibility as part of the study (Solianik et al., 2020).

To my knowledge, no previous study examines spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility under four gathered main criteria; collage (scientific and literary), education level (fourth and seventh), gender (male and female), and marital status (married and single) where the case study taken from Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University Saudi Arabia this research studied the level of mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence for the student, check if there is a relationship

between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence and how the level of mental flexibility and the spiritual intelligence varies as the main four criteria vary.

The sections of the article are organized as follows: section two literature review, section three research method, section four result, section five discussion, section six conclusion, section seven recommendation, and section eight references.

### **1. Literature review:**

There are many studies propagated in the field of psychology, where the changes of life increased, because of the numbers of concepts that appear in our worlds such as spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility. In the region of these two axes, researchers try to crystalize the view that surrounds both, context the most comprehensive definitions, the most effective factors could have positive or negative feeding to stoking (SI) and (MF) and study the development both through all categories of ages, to helping in improve human life quality.

(Solianik et al., 2020) checked the effectiveness of fasting 48-hours on mental flexibility with evoked stress, cognitive and motor function. The sample of study contains eleven women aged range (63-80) years the measurements are taken under two random conditions; one is a 48-hours usual diet the second is a 48-hours zero-calorie diet with water provided ad-libidum. Many indicators that have been measure; cortisol level, mood state, cognitive performance automatic function, visuomotor coordination, balance and motor speed, readings are taken before and after the two diets, the result indicated that fasting (48-hour) decreased mental flexibility, increased fatigue, but improved balance.

From a medical and psychological perspective, (Mogadam et al., 2018) examined the temporal dynamics of brain activity related to mental flexibility in children, the sample study contains 22 children their ages take position in the range (8-15) years as male and female the data collected by magnetoencephalography (MEG) and they found that children using two regions from the brain using in mental flexibility one is the front parietal network, the same as adults, and the other is posterior parietal cortices. Also, the temporal pole and premotor areas acting as support for the previous two regions. Additionally, there is a difference in growth in the brain activation time in the region that supports mental flexibility the reason comes from a large decrease in the time activation with age progress.

(Istiariani and Arifah, 2020) focus their study on an accountant Indonesian student to examine the effect of spiritual intelligence, education level, and love of money on their ethical perception. The spiritual intelligent part in the study indicated that it has positive potential on accountant students' ethical perception and negative relation with the love of money.

(Krisnanda and Surya, 2019) knocked by their research the field of the leadership and employee performance to seeking the effect spiritual of intelligence on that field and they used all operators (40) employees of gas station Pratma Anugrah Dewater as samples for their research, the result of the study was that spiritual intelligence had a positive effect on the employee performance and on the transformational leadership.

(Anwar and Osman, 2015) study the effect of spiritual intelligent dimensions on the organization citizenship behavioural (OCB). The research was applied to employees working in service and manufacturing companies in Malaysia. The spiritual intelligent dimensions were taken by the study, critical existential thinking, personal meaning production, transcendental awareness, conscious state expansion. Where the demographic variable of the respondents includes gender, age group, marital status, the highest level of education, religion, and level of employment. The research reaches these results there is a positive significant relationship between (OCB) organization citizenship behaviour and two dimensions of SI which are transcendental awareness and personal meaning production. Also, individuals who have high SI show more rationalism and lead their behaviours within their emotional experience's context.

(Yousif, 2020) studied the effectiveness of using imaging techniques to teach Islamic education to develop spiritual intelligence and academic self-efficacy. The study was applied among high school students and dealt with the component of spiritual intelligence (spiritual awakening, spiritual ability, and spiritual existence) and with dimensions of academic self-efficacy (self-motivation and perseverance in learning, confidence in the possibility of successful completion, self-regulation of learning). The study showed the imagination techniques were effective in developing spiritual intelligence through developing its components. Also, developing academic self-efficacy through developing its dimensions.

(Al-Agdaf, 2020) sought to develop the spiritual intelligence among high school students (female) by the heuristic program. Where spiritual intelligence scale was built to the aim of the



study and contain six dimensions (truthfulness, honesty, patience, altruism, forgiveness, and responsibility bear). The result of the study showed that the heuristic program was effective in developing spiritual intelligence in high school students (female).

### 3. Research Method:

#### 3.1 Sample selection:

The aim of the present study is to investigate the interconnection between selected variables with mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence both separately, so the research building in the quantitative standard. Where the study sample included students from prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University Saudi Arabia and the sample contains 242 students, were selected under four categorizations each one divided into two parts as shown below in the table.1:

Table 1. Distribution of the sample members according to the personal and learning variables

Categorization	Variables	Number of respondents	Percent %
College	Literary	114	47.1
	Scientific	128	52.9
	Total	242	100.0
Study level	Fourth	135	55.8
	Seventh	107	44.2
	Total	242	100.0
Gender	Male	161	66.5
	Female	81	33.5
	Total	242	100.0
Social status	Married	34	14.0
	Single	208	86.0
	Total	242	100.0

From table.1 the number of respondents from these variables is greater than the other from the same criteria; for the collage scientific, for study level seventh level, for gender male and for social status single.

### 3.2 Stability of the study tools:

To extract the stability of the study tool, the study tool was applied to an exploratory sample of (30) students, and the correlation coefficient between the two applications was calculated to extract the stability of the repetition (Test.R.test), and the tool stability equation (Cronbach Alpha) was also applied to all fields of study and the tool as a whole, as shown below in the table.2:

Table 2. Reliability coefficients by the two methods return R.test and Cronbach's alpha( $\alpha$ ) study measures

Criterion	Number of paragraphs of the questionnaire	Repeatability coefficient of stability R.test	Coefficient of reliability (Cronbach's alpha, $\alpha$ )
Mental flexibility	26	0.95	0.94
Spiritual intelligence	49	0.84	0.93

From table.2 this information was extracted:

- For mental flexibility: repeatability coefficient of stability R.test recorded (0.95), and Coefficient of reliability (Cronbach's alpha,  $\alpha$ ) recorded (0.94) which are high stability coefficients that are acceptable for the purposes of the study.
- For spiritual intelligence: repeatability coefficient of stability R.test recorded (0.84), and Coefficient of reliability (Cronbach's alpha,  $\alpha$ ) recorded (0.93) which are high stability coefficients that are acceptable for the purposes of the study.

### 3.3 Ladder evaluation of answers:

Likert scale with pentagonal gradient was used to evaluate the opinion (as data) of respondents of the study sample within the two scales of the study (mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence). The ladder of the scale starts from (1) to (5) where (1) = never, (2) = little, (3) sometimes, (4) very, and (5) = always, also the study stands on the following categorize to judge on the arithmetic means:

- Less than 2.33 (low).
- From (2.34- 3.66) (medium).

- From (3.67- 5.00) (high).

### 3.4 Statistical processors:

Statistical processors were used by the SPSS program to answer the study questions, as follow:

- The frequencies and percentages of the personal and learning variables of the study sample.
- The arithmetic means and standard deviations of the answers of the study sample individuals for all the study measures.
- Pearson's correlation Coefficient between two scales.
- Quaternary analysis variance (ANOVA 4-way) to show the difference for each scale under study variables.

### 4.Result:

This part includes the results of the study aimed at identifying spiritual intelligence, mental flexibility, and the relationship between both from the viewpoint of Sattam University students.

The results will be presented based on the study questions as follows:

Q1. What is the level of mental flexibility for Sattam University students?

To answer this question, means and standard deviations were calculated for the paragraphs of the questionnaire related with mental flexibility and total degree was evaluated as shown in table.3:

Table 3. Means and standard deviations were calculated for the paragraphs of the questionnaire related with mental flexibility and total degree was evaluated.

Number	Paragraph	Means	Standard deviations	Rank	Degree
1	I seek to understand the components of the problem to solve it.	4.45	0.79	1	
2	I try to find solutions to the problem even if it seems impossible to me.	4.25	0.84	2	high
3	I can change the way I think about the problem I am facing.	4.14	0.86	3	high

4	I am working on rearranging the problem in order to solve it	4.10	0.92	5	high
5	I try to live with the situations that I face in order to be able to solve them.	4.14	0.87	3	high
6	Analysing the problem into simple elements contributes to producing diverse ideas.	4.08	0.91	7	high
7	Dialogues about a position make me better able to produce diverse ideas.	4.07	0.94	8	high
8	I use my personal skills that are commensurate with the problems I face, to reach a solution	4.06	0.85	9	high
9	I seek to form connections between my thoughts about a situation and patterns of behaviour.	4.02	0.95	11	high
10	I can deal with the emergency conditions that I face in different situations.	3.95	1.00	15	high
11	Repeating behaviour patterns in my life skills contribute to the diversity and freshness of my ideas	3.83	1.02	22	high
12	An individual who sticks to his opinion about a situation that is intellectually rigid.	3.72	1.06	24	high
13	I can stop continuing to solve a problem and adapt to new proposed solutions.	3.68	1.06	25	high
14	I strive to produce as many diverse ideas as possible about any problem that I encounter.	3.99	0.95	13	high
15	I am interested in diverse ideas even if they are strange about the problem facing me.	3.99	1.01	13	high
16	I can adapt an idea to suit my situation.	3.95	0.90	15	high
17	Allow my thoughts to slip out of the specified frames as I grapple with the problem.	3.74	1.01	23	high
18	I can switch thoughts as long as it helps me in	3.94	1.02	17	high

	facing a situation.				
19	Use unconventional ideas in the face of a problem as long as it helps solve it.	3.86	0.99	21	high
20	I believe that the diversity of my thoughts is unique.	4.02	1.02	11	high
21	I prefer changing my attitudes toward a topic if the change leads to positive results.	4.10	0.97	5	high
22	I prefer to repeat my attempts to solve the problem no matter what time and effort it takes.	3.91	0.99	18	high
23	My use of more than one idea in the face of one situation prompts me to confront other situations.	3.90	0.97	19	high
24	My repetition in the diversity of my thoughts about the situations I face pulls me out of the intellectual deadlock.	3.87	1.00	20	high
25	I strive to produce the most ideas on a topic when sharing with my colleagues.	4.06	0.99	9	high
26	I am rigid and indifferent if my thoughts are restricted.	3.38	1.24	26	medium
Scale (mental flexibility) as total		3.97	0.61	-	high

Q.2: What is the level of spiritual intelligence for Sattam University students?

To answer this question, means and standard deviations were calculated for the paragraphs of the questionnaire related to spiritual intelligence, and the total degree was evaluated as shown in the table.4:

Table 4 Means and standard deviations were calculated for the paragraphs of the questionnaire related with spiritual intelligence and total degree was evaluated.

Number	Paragraph	Means	Standard deviations	Rank	Degree
1.	I know my strengths and weaknesses.	3.70	0.92	11	high

2.	I make values and principles a guideline for my life.	3.68	0.91	14	high
3.	I reflect deeply on the relationship between man and the rest of the universe.	3.62	0.89	30	medium
4.	I am aware of the deep communication between myself and others.	3.67	0.88	16	high
5.	I am aware of the non-material aspects of life.	3.56	0.96	43	medium
6.	I control my feelings and thoughts when interacting with others.	3.61	0.95	32	medium
7.	I put the things that are going through me in a larger context so that I can show you, their importance.	3.61	0.91	34	medium
8.	To develop clear ideas, see things in a comprehensive manner.	3.63	0.91	28	medium
9.	I developed theories of my own about things like life, death, truth and existence.	3.61	0.89	32	medium
10.	I tend to ask the essential questions when talking about important topics	3.60	0.90	35	medium
11.	I treat others better than they treat me.	3.64	0.95	26	medium
12.	Think better about others in their behaviour towards me.	3.57	0.94	40	medium
13.	In my daily life I feel that my work serves the entire universe.	3.53	0.96	44	medium
14.	Financial rewards are not the basis of any work I do.	3.38	0.95	48	medium
15.	I am looking for integration with others and reconciliation between them.	3.60	0.90	34	medium
16.	I tend to be a supportive person, a giving back to others.	3.60	0.99	36	medium

17.	I feel very effective when helping others.	3.64	1.00	27	medium
18.	In my actions, I take into consideration the general and extended interest of all people.	3.65	0.93	20	medium
19.	I walk based on the lofty values that I possess.	3.64	0.90	24	medium
20.	I try to leave a good trail.	3.80	0.95	4	high
21.	I know that I have obligations to the world that must be fulfilled and fulfilled.	3.52	1.02	45	medium
22.	Silence my anger and forgive those who wronged me.	3.45	0.95	47	medium
23.	I share prominent interests in my community.	3.48	0.94	46	medium
24.	Finding meaning in my life makes me more adaptive to stress.	3.65	0.95	18	medium
25.	Make my decisions in light of my goals and aspirations.	3.64	0.95	23	medium
26.	I think about the meaning of life constantly.	3.62	0.98	30	medium
27.	I live my life with crystal clear goals.	3.55	0.92	43	medium
28.	I have a strong ability to find meaning in life.	3.57	0.93	41	medium
29.	I live with suffering, and I try to get the best of it.	3.65	0.90	21	medium
30.	I believe in the value of everything I strive to achieve in my life.	3.68	0.97	15	high
31.	The achievements I achieve create meaning in my life.	3.76	0.96	7	high
32.	Life seems so interesting to me.	3.66	1.02	17	medium
33.	I feel that life is worth living.	3.71	0.95	10	high
34.	I work on the harmony of my life with what God loves and pleases.	3.79	1.03	5	high

35.	I dedicate my life to a purpose.	3.64	1.00	25	medium
36.	I develop myself spiritually by practicing regular rituals.	3.67	1.05	17	high
37.	I consider my life valuable and try to take advantage of every moment of it.	3.69	1.03	13	high
38.	I feel happy when performing religious rituals.	3.76	1.03	6	high
39.	I spend time to contemplate and ponder the laws of the universe.	3.64	0.95	22	medium
40.	Rely on a deep belief in God when facing life's challenges.	3.89	1.02	1	high
41.	In times of suffering, I remember lessons and aphorisms.	3.70	1.01	12	high
42.	Performing rituals helps me to face life's challenges.	3.81	1.02	3	high
43.	Use things that remind me of the greatness and wisdom of the Creator.	3.74	0.97	9	high
44.	I take times for self-reflection and renewal.	3.60	1.01	37	medium
45.	Continuing to remember God makes me feel reassured.	3.87	0.99	2	high
46.	Meditation of nature around me feels wonderful and beautiful.	3.75	0.97	8	high
47.	I walk based on the spirituality that I possess.	3.57	0.88	39	medium
48.	I strive to be faithful in everything I do.	3.60	0.92	38	medium
Scale (spiritual intelligence) as total		3.65	0.71	---	---

Q3.: Is there a relationship between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence for Sattam University students?

To answer this question correlation coefficients between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence were calculated for Sattam University students as shown in table.5:



Table 5 Correlation coefficients between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence.

Variable		Spiritual intelligence
Mental flexibility	Correlation coefficients	0.445**
	Statistical significance	(0.0001)
** related at level (0.01)		

Q.4: Does the level of mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence differ according to the variables of the study (College, Study level, Gender, Social status)?

To answer this question, means and standard deviations were calculated for the level of mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence according to the study variables (College, Study level, Gender, Social status), and apply quaternary analysis variance (ANOVA 4-way) as shown in table 6:

Table 6. Means and standard deviations were calculated for level of mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence according to the study variables (College, Study level, Gender, Social status)

Scale	Categorization	Variables	Number of respondents	Means	Standard deviations
Mental Flexibility	College	Literary	114	4.01	0.61
		Scientific	128	3.93	0.61
	Study level	Fourth	161	4.02	0.61
		Seventh	81	3.87	0.61
	Gender	Male	34	3.94	0.69
		Female	208	3.97	0.60
	Social status	Married	135	3.86	0.60
		Single	107	4.11	0.61
Spiritual Intelligence	College	Literary	114	3.70	0.68
		Scientific	128	3.59	0.73
	Study level	Fourth	161	3.68	0.72
		Seventh	81	3.56	0.67
	Gender	Male	34	3.62	0.65
		Female	208	3.64	0.71

	Social status	Married	135	3.54	0.67
		Single	107	3.77	0.73

Also, to find out the statistical significance of these differences, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied as shown in tables 7, 8.

Table 7. Results of analysis of variance (ANOVA-4-way) detect differences in mental flexibility according to the study variables (College, Study level, Gender, Social status)

Categorization	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Average of squares	F value	F statistical significance
College	.176	1	.176	.480	.489
Study level	2.428	1	2.428	6.636	.011
Gender	.021	1	.021	.057	.811
Social status	.036	1	.036	.098	.755
error	86.708	237	.366	---	---
Total Corrected	90.769	241	---	---	---

Table 8 Results of analysis of variance (ANOVA-4-way) detect differences in spiritual intelligence according to the study variables (College, Study level, Gender, Social status)

Categorization	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Average of squares	F value	F statistical significance
College	.443	1	.443	.892	.346
Study level	1.915	1	1.915	3.853	.051
Gender	.006	1	.006	.013	.911
Social status	.009	1	.009	.018	.893
error	117.800	237	.497	---	---
Total Corrected	121.294	241	---	---	---

## 5. Discussion:

Table.3 shows that mean values take range between (3.38-4.45), where paragraph number (1) which states " Paragraph I seek to understand the components of the problem to solve it" takes rank 1 with a mean (4.45) and high degree, and the last rank (26) which states " I am rigid and indifferent if my thoughts are restricted " with a mean (3.38) and medium degree. Also, the mean of mental flexibility as total reach to (3.97) with high degree. This result is attributed to the concerted efforts, whether from modern family upbringing, school, university, and the media, from adopting democratic education that calls for the abandonment of stagnation and flexibility in education and the call for renewal. Facing him and trying to solve them by finding many alternatives to achieve the goal, especially as we live in an era of rapid change and technological revolution.

Table.4 shows that mean values of spiritual intelligence take range between (3.38-3.89), where paragraph number (40) which states " Rely on a deep belief in God when facing life's challenges" takes rank 1 with a mean (3.89) and high degree and the last rank (14) which states " Financial rewards are not the basis of any work I do " with a mean (3.38) and medium degree. Also, the mean of spiritual intelligence as total reach to (3.65) with medium degree. The reason for this result is attributed to the methods of superficial religious education that focus on practicing rituals outwardly without establishing the spiritual side as food for the soul, due to the lack of awareness of the importance of spiritual intelligence in building and refining the personality of the individual, for example, the spiritual questions that the son asks in the prime of his life are ignored or answered. Superficially and unclear, the child grows up in a state of spiritual instability, and this is also what happens in school and university curricula that did not give the spiritual side its right, as subjects were not assigned to the independent curriculum that develops spiritual intelligence, due to lack of awareness of the importance of this in raising an independent, flexible, benevolent generation The growth of spiritual intelligence remains dependent on individual efforts by the individual himself, in his endeavour to reach a state of spiritual stability.

From table.5 there is a positive and strong correlation coefficient between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence equal to (0.445) with Statistical significance equal to (0.00). This indicates that there is a strong positive correlation coefficient between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence. This result consistent with the theory of Horen and Cattell Horen & Cattel, as this

theory sees that flow intelligence is individual capabilities that help to understand and deduce existential issues and explain the mental flexibility developed by spiritual intelligence (King, 2008)

From table.6, Apparent differences between averages of the answers of the study sample in the standard for the level of mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence according to the study variables (College, Study level, Gender, Social status) is clear.

It is shown from table.7 that the existence of statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) In mental flexibility, depending on the variable of the academic level, as

it reached a value ( $F=6.636$ ) with statistical significance (0.011). The arithmetic mean has been reached for the seventh level to (4.11) and (3.86) for the fourth level. This is attributed to the increased awareness and experience of the seventh-level students compared to the fourth level, as they have applied for graduation doors and have benefited from their previous experiences, changing their viewpoints, diversifying their thinking, and diverting their course in line with the requirements of the situation.

There is no existence of statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) in mental flexibility following to the study variables (College, Gender, Social status), where the value of (F) did not reach to the level of statistically significant.

Finally, It is shown from table8, There is no existence of statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) in spiritual intelligence following to the study variables

(College, study of level, Gender, Social status), where the value of (F) did not reach to level of statistically significant. This is due to the similarity between the study sample members in family upbringing, methods of study, and the problems they face on campus, regardless of gender, specialization, or marital status.

## **6. Conclusion:**

Psychological environment expands its scope to include concepts that have emerged the need with the developments and changes introduced during life and their impact on the human psyche and its intellectual productivity and the consequences thereof. Two of that concepts are spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility.

The result of the current study indicates that the level of mental flexibility for Sattam University students was high, this comes from the efforts, whether from modern family upbringing, school, university, and the media, from adopting democratic education that calls for the abandonment of stagnation and flexibility in education and the call for renewal. Facing him and trying to solve them by finding many alternatives to achieve the goal, especially as we live in an era of rapid change and technological revolution.

Where the level of spiritual intelligence for Sattam University students was medium. there is a positive and strong correlation coefficient between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence, this related to the methods of superficial religious education that focus on practicing rituals outwardly without establishing the spiritual side as food for the soul, due to the lack of awareness of the importance of spiritual intelligence in building and refining the personality of the individual.

There is a strong positive correlation coefficient between mental flexibility and spiritual intelligence.

There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) In mental flexibility, depending on the variable of the academic level, as it reached a value ( $F=6.636$ ) with statistical significance (0.011). This is attributed to the increased awareness and experience of the seventh-level students compared to the fourth level, as they have applied for graduation doors and have benefited from their previous experiences, changing their viewpoints, diversifying their thinking, and diverting their course in line with the requirements of the situation. There is no existence of statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) in mental flexibility following to the study variables (College, Gender, Social status). Also, no existence of statistically significant differences at the level of significance ( $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ) in spiritual intelligence following to the study variables (College, study of level, Gender, Social status), This is due to the similarity between the study sample members in family upbringing, methods of study, and the problems they face on campus, regardless of gender, specialization, or marital status.

## **7. Recommendations:**

- Conduct similar studies to this study across different age stages, such as adolescence and childhood.

- Conducting similar studies in which spiritual intelligence and mental flexibility are studied and its relationship to other variables such as features -personality and self-confidence of adolescents.

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**NO. 16**

**Organizational management and resistance to change among workers of  
administrative departments in public sector companies  
( (Mauritanie - Senegal - Mali**

**Prepared by**



**Prof. Dr. Mabrouk Miftah Abu Sheneh  
Africa University of Humanities &  
Applied Sciences**

## **Abstract**

Despite the necessity and importance of change for organizations, this process is hardly devoid of the difficulties of workers' resistance to the introduction of these changes, due to the workers' economic, social and organizational concerns based on objective and non-objective bases, and here comes the role of managers in reducing the severity of this resistance, through Adopting appropriate leadership styles to make employees understand the goals of change and the positive results that will be achieved for them.

What are the reasons that lead to the resistance of administrative workers to change in companies in general, and in public sector companies in African countries in particular?

Through the study and analysis of the nature of leadership styles used by managers in the companies under study, and identifying the nature of the organizational dimension that leads to workers' resistance to change, and after testing the hypotheses that pertain to the relationship between managers' leadership styles and their impact on the removal of workers to change, the researcher can summarize the results of the study next:

1. The results of the study showed that there are statistically significant differences between leadership styles in influencing workers' resistance to change.
2. The results of the study showed that the rate of workers' resistance to change in the companies under study reached 70%, which is a relatively high rate, and the reason for this may be due to the low tendency of managers to use the democratic leadership style despite the lack of sufficient data to judge in this way, as indicated by the answers related to leadership styles, which reduces workers' understanding of the content of the change process, and the organizational dimension is one of the important reasons for the high rate of this rate due to the lack of workers' participation in the change process and the imposition of change by management without the desire to announce it for the purpose of persuading workers, in addition to the weakness of continuous communication between management and workers, which leads to workers feeling job instability.

### **Key words:**

Organizational management, resistance to change, workers in administrative departments, public sector companies

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
**NO. 16**

**Measuring the impact of money supply on inflation rates in Iraq's  
Economy after 2003**

**Prepared by**



**A. Prof-Dr. Qassem Askari Ibn Karim**  
Department of Economics  
[Gh-asaman@yahoo.com](mailto:Gh-asaman@yahoo.com)



Najlah shamoon shlaymoon  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[nashch70@gmail.com](mailto:nashch70@gmail.com)



Ahmed Jabbar Shaye  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[ajab98512@gmail.com](mailto:ajab98512@gmail.com)



Maram Albusharbe  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[maramalbushrby@gmle.com](mailto:maramalbushrby@gmle.com)

## **Abstract**

Inflation is sometimes referred to as (a increase in the rate of prices, implying a loss in the value of the monetary unit) or (a rise in the rate of prices, implying a decrease in the value of the monetary unit) or (a rise in the rate of prices, implying (it is a continuous rise in prices and not just high prices)). According to Keynes (correct inflation is the situation in which no additional increase in total demand leads to an additional increase in production).. Regardless of the various definitions, forms, and causes of inflation, inflation remains primarily a monetary phenomenon. Controlling it, on the other hand, necessitates regulating the money supply to ensure that it rises at a rate that is compatible with demand and at stable prices. The amount of money in the Iraqi market is remarkable, and large amounts of it are no longer sufficient to buy a basic commodity or service, to the point where following up on the rise in the prices of goods, merchandise, and services in Iraq to estimate their rates has become a difficult process due to the continuous rise in their prices.

**Keywords:** Money supply; Inflation rates; Exchange rate; Monetary policies

## **Introduction**

Modern policies seek to achieve significant broad-based development, but reality imposes imbalances that affect all spheres of working life (research). Inflation is one of the most important of these imbalances in the world's countries, especially today. Despite the focus and interest of economists, especially after the Second World War. Research on inflation as one of the most important economic phenomena has been and continues to be inking in the literature on economics and money at the local and global levels. Perhaps the pleasure of research on a topic comes from the novelty and importance of inflation in that it affects the economy and its development and, on the other hand, is an indispensable means of development that has been advanced or developing as an important factor for the development.

In recent decades, Iraq has undergone significant political developments that have had an impact on various aspects of life, including the economic aspect. Iraq's economy has fluctuated in many economic variables depending on political realities and circumstances. Despite all these developments and variations in economic policy trends and in the use of their tools, the common denominator over the past years has been inflation. Iraq's overall price level has risen throughout the 1990s and 2000s and has been one of the kind of creeping inflation that has been sustained over the course of this period. The evolution of money supply has been a factor; Mainly in the occurrence and development of this problem in various economies, including the Iraqi economy.

## **Research problem:**

The Iraqi economy suffers from high prices of goods and services, adversely affecting the economic and social life of the consumer, both money supply and imported inflation on the Iraqi economy.

## **Research Hypothesis**

The most important hypothesis of this study is that Iraq's economy suffers from inflation due to monetary factors.

First hypothesis, no moral impact of money supply on inflation in the Iraqi economy

The alternative hypothesis, the moral effect of money supply on inflation in the Iraqi economy..

## **Search objective**

The main objective is to create the relationship between inflation on the one hand and the most important factors influencing it and the important money supply.

## **Research importance**

It seems important to research by recognizing the impact of money supply on inflation, through discretionary standard relationships to reach clear digital mathematical results through which solutions and recommendations are presented to monetary policymakers to reduce the negative effects of inflation on the Iraqi economy.

## **Research Methodology**

The research adopted the methodology of descriptive and metric analysis based on statistical tools in the analysis of the relationship between money supply as the (independent variable) and inflation as the (dependent variable), for the period from 2003-2017 to study measuring the impact of increased money supply on raising inflation boundaries in Iraq's economy..

### **1<sup>st</sup>. The concept of inflation**

It is agreed between finance experts in particular and economists in general that the word inflation does not have a single meaning or a specific concept. And this is to vary what it means and when it came, Analysts also have different views and interpretation of the theory of the value of money, as the quantitative factor is one of the most important factors used in the interpretation of inflationary phenomena. We will therefore be exposed to the most important definitions of inflation, methods of measurement and the most important theories interpreted.

## 1. Definition of inflation

What is Inflation if we go back to economic history is that the origin of the word Which means exaggeration. However, economic reality has shown that the definition of inflation is governed by disciplines and foundations where the concepts of inflation are multiplied according to the multiplicity and diversity of these disciplines, the foundations and the multiple views of economists on these disciplines and the foundations in defining and demonstrating the meaning of inflation. (Al-Din, 2000)

First definition:

"Each increase in the amount of cash leads to an increase in the overall level of prices" in the sense that the more we add in the market, the higher the price, the higher the inflation phenomenon, assuming other things stays the same. However, it facilitates superficial observation and the generality of this definition is lacking in accuracy and clarity and the sincerity of its own evidence (Qatif, 2006).

Second definition:

Some economists, based on the theory of income and expenditure, define inflation as follows: "" is the increase in the rate of expenditure and income ". Increasing cash expenditure and hence cash income causes prices to rise and inflate on the requirement that the quantity of existing goods remain stable (Rashad al-Assar, 2009).

However, this definition suggests that cash incomes may increase without the increase being attributed to monetary factors such as higher workers' wages or to the increase in the rate of cash expenditure. Moreover, in the event of a transition from recession to prosperity, the growth of cash income cannot be described as inflationary (Abdelkader, 2009).

## 2. Methods of measuring inflation

As already experienced in publicizing the phenomenon of inflation, the general manifestation of this phenomenon is the continuous rise in prices. Thus, this phenomenon can be extrapolated from tracking the evolution of price indices. The continuous rise in price indices is a general indication of the existence of this phenomenon, but it is not a reason for its existence and is the result of inflationary forces resulting from imbalances in the national economy. It is therefore worth initially identifying the indices as a tool for measuring change in the value of money, and secondly to identify inflationary gaps aimed at measuring overall price pressure (Mohammed, 1988).

### A. Price Index Numbers

Price indices are defined as relative and time averages of prices and are prepared for different types of commodities or their sum, expressed in monetary units to measure the purchasing unit of individuals, projects and various sectors, and from this definition we derive the following (Al-Rifai, 2009):

**- Standard numbers are relative numbers:**

Any comparison of price developments for a given year is the base year that is stable and measured by the change for the year in which it is required to know the base changes that are called the base year

As price developments lead over a period of time, the latter can be considered a fundamental variable and among the formulas used in the indices we find:

- > Wholesale price index reflects individuals' standard of living.
- > Retail price index is considered about consumers' purchasing power.
- > Living Expenditure Index

In fact, there is an encroachment relationship between these versions of the indices. When a record moves, it moves the other numbers with it. That is, the movement of these formulas is a parallel movement especially in inflationary periods. However, economists differ in the challenge of the best type that can be used to measure the purchasing power of cash given the different level reflected in each formula, but generally the index of living expenditures is the most important measure in inflationary periods (Yassin, 2009).

**Lasper Formula:-**

The weight in this formula is the quantities in the year of the foundations and the mathematical formula is:

$$h = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i Q_0}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_0 Q_0} \times 100$$

Where

haspyres: record h

Total:

Commodity price in P1 comparison year

Commodity price in base year P0

Quantity of commodity in the base year Q0

The weight here is quantities in the comparison period estimated at base year prices i.e.:

$$p\% = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i Q_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i Q_0} \times 100$$

Where

Peache: P Record

Quantity of commodity in Qi comparison year

**Fisher Formula:-**

$p = \sqrt{p \times L}$  It is the geometric average of Bash formula and Lasper where:

FICHER : F



PEACHE: P  
LASPPYRES: L

### **3. Types of inflation in terms of its characteristics**

Given the characteristics of inflation, we find two criteria for determining its types: the first criterion in terms of the severity of inflationary pressure. The second criterion concerns different inflationary sectors.

A. Standard of inflationary pressure intensity ((Annaba), 1992)

Inflation in terms of its severity and degree of strength can be divided into runaway inflation and medium inflation.

#### **- Hyperinflation**

This type of inflation is considered to be a danger to the national economy at all so that prices rise imaginatively and consistently to the extent that it has a difficult impact on monetary authorities to reduce and address as the purchasing power of money drops to the point where it loses value as an intermediary for exchange and is sad for values, prompting individuals to dispose of it. Which has happened in many countries in the wake of the two world wars as Germany? Russia and Romania, Germany's inflation is all-time high at 1,000 billion times.

Some economists believe that this type of inflation remains rare because it is linked to a range of reasons, including the emergence of what is known as social disintegration, the collapse of economic activity and the inability of governments to control the people. This type of inflation is also particularly linked to the remnants of war and the resulting external obligations that lead the authorities to reduce their currency for disposal.

#### **- Moderate "unbridled" inflation**

This type of inflation is characterized by higher prices, but at lower levels than those defined by unruly inflation. This means that its effects are less serious for the economy. There is no loss of confidence in the cash in circulation in general. The most important feature of this inflation is the ability of government authorities to treat and combat it and reduce its negative effects on the economy (Hathloul, 2006).

### **B. Criteria for different economic sectors**

The diversity of existing economic sectors has led to the diversification of inflationary sectors. Inflation in consumer industries is different from that in investment sectors. Inflation in the commodity market is different from inflation in the factor market. On this basis, Ketter distinguishes between two types of inflation:

#### **- Inflation in commodity markets**

According to Ketter, the prevalent types of inflation in commodity markets are commodity inflation and capital inflation.

## **Commodity inflation**

This inflation in the consumer industries sector occurs when the cost of producing investment goods increases savings, i.e. individuals turn to consumption at the expense of their savings. This is reflected positively on entrepreneurs in consumer goods industries.

## **Capital inflation**

Inflation in the investment industries sector reflects an increase in the value of investment commodities at the expense of their production, benefiting both consumption and investment sectors.

### **- Inflation in factor markets**

Ketter differentiates between two types of inflationary trends rampant in factor markets and their effects on individuals' cash incomes

### **Inflation for profit**

Is the inflation that emerges from the penalty of increased investment on savings so that profits are achieved in the consumer commodity industries sector and the investment commodity industries sector

### **Inflation**

This type of inflation is the result of higher workers' wages resulting in increased production expenditures and thus higher prices of factors of production.

## **2<sup>nd</sup>. Money Supply**

The volume of expenditure corresponding to the current production of goods and services is the focal point of the analysis of the monetary economy. This volume fundamentally affects economic well-being through its impact on output, employment and price levels.

This volume of expenditure, from a cash point of view, is a cash balance multiplier in the cash turnover velocity factor. Monetary policy takes its place from the cash balance without the rapid turnover of cash for two reasons: first, that the volume of cash spending is directly linked to the size of the economy's cash balance. and the second. Cash balance can be managed by monetary authorities while they cannot control the speed of cash turnover\*. The cash balance thus takes its economic content and importance through its relation to expenditure size and its impact on production, employment and prices on the one hand, and as a result of its control and management on the other.

In order for monetary authorities entrusted with managing the monetary policy of the economy in question to exert their influence on the cash balance, the sources of monetary supply must be specific.

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\* The speed of cash turnover is not only inverted by the proportion of real resources that individuals want to keep in liquid cash. and the rapid turnover of cash depends on the progress of the financial and banking systems and payment reconciliation habits, The rapid movement of people from one place to another depends on the degree of population density and society's habits in terms of income allocation between savings and consumption. and all these aspects are out of control and change at least slowly in the short term.

## **1. What is money supply in the traditional economy:**

The concept of cash supply is directed to the balance of things that are used as an intermediary in exchange. Within this general concept, the concepts of cash supply are multiplied according to each of these concepts. Along with cash in circulation and auxiliary currency, of the types of things that have a very high degree of liquidity, i.e. those that can be immediately converted into money without fluctuation in value or volatility that occurs at minimal levels. In this light, three concepts of monetary supply are distinguished:

**Narrow concept: It is commonly symbolized by the symbol M1**

Deposits calculated within this cross-cutting concept are current deposits for the private sector only to "net currency in circulation" and current deposits for the private sector (Hashim, 1969).

**And the broad concept: It is symbolized by the symbol M2**

In addition to the narrow concept components include semi-cash, which are forward deposits, short-term savings deposits of commercial banks as well as mailbox deposits,

**And the concept of local liquidity: is symbolized by the symbol M3**

In addition to the broad concept components, other highly liquid assets such as non-family deposits, bonds and government authorizations are included (Ruby, 2000).

## **2. Cash Offer Determinants:**

In most countries, there are certain controls over monetary authorities' conduct in issuing cash quantities available for trading. The monetary policy in determining the amount of money being traded is subject to several considerations, including:

- A. The impact of the amount of cash on the level of credit.
- B. The size of the State's employment.
- C. Amount of inactivated productive materials.
- D. Periods of inflation and contraction are punished.

The preceding considerations are influential and effective in determining the amount of cash by the State's monetary authorities, and therefore many economists see the money supply process as a variable element that is inflexible (Yahya W. Y., 2000).

## **3. Factors influencing the determination of a cash offer:**

### **A. Central Bank: Affects Cash Offer Through**

- Cash multiplier: It is done through the legal reserve ratio on time deposits (inverse relationship with cash offer).
- Cash base by:
  - Borrowing rule.
  - Non-borrowing rule.

### **B. Commercial Banks:**

- Through multiplier (m): The greater the amount of retention of surplus reserves, the greater the leakage in the multiplier, the lower the supply of cash and vice versa. The amount of retention in commercial banks is affected by several things:
  - Risk associated with withdrawals.
  - Its ability to borrow.
  - Interest rate.
  - The cost of borrowing from the central bank.
  - Fear of bank failure.
- Monetary Rule (MB): Commercial banks' desire to borrow from the Central Bank or unwillingness (borrowing rule) affects the monetary base. Borrowing increases the total reserves (R) and therefore MB increases with the offer of cash and vice versa.

**C. Audience: The public influences the cash multiplier by how much they wish to retain in the form of the trading process (r) and the public's behaviour is influenced by several factors:**

- The more a person's wealth, the less students on (r) and the more on deposits.
- Return on assets.
- Desire to retain liquid assets.
- The amount of progress of bank return in the public.
- The increase in banking reduces the supply of cash.
- Illegal operations such as money laundering (Samo Bloon, 2006).

**3<sup>th</sup>. Relationship between Iraq's cash supply and inflation (2003-2017)**

Interest in studying this phenomenon began after the Second World War, where the world's economies began to coincide continuously. This prompted governments to pay attention to this phenomenon by finding efficient fiscal and monetary solutions for the purpose of overcoming or addressing inflation. "The lack of control over this phenomenon will have serious economic, social and political consequences. The Iraqi economy has experienced waves of inflation since the 1970s after oil prices erupted, with increased rates of monetary issuance increasing salaries. The decade of the Iraqi-Iranian war worsened in the 1980s and grew in the 1990s. As a result of the interaction of many and real factors over time associated with structural imbalances, these factors are added to the underdevelopment of banking habits, as well as the low flexibility of the Iraqi economy in its productive sectors and high production and import costs, which was reflected in higher inflation rates. During the 1990s, Iraq witnessed a marked rise in price levels following higher inflation rates. Inflation rose during 2005-2006 (Iraq, (2003-2017)), reaching 37-53%, respectively. The reason for this was the relationship between the value of the local currency and the exchange rate. The lower the value of the local currency, the higher the exchange rate, and consequently the higher inflation rates and the higher the government tunnels (Hindi, 2010). (% 10.0) in 2007 and (% 2.8 in 2010) This decrease in inflation rate is due to the continuous pursuit by the central bank to reduce inflation rate by following a monetary and financial policy in line with the raising of the IQD value in front of foreign currencies. (2016-2011) Compared to previous years, the general inflation rate was the lowest (1.39%) in 2015. As shown in table (1).

Table (1)  
Inflation and money supply rates in Iraq's economy  
During the period (2003-2012)

Money Supply m2	(%) Inflation rate	The year
2898	32.5	2003
12254	26.9	2004
14684	36.9	2005
21080	53.2	2006
26956	30.8	2008
34920	(-)2.8	2009

45438	2.5	2010
60386	5.6	2011
72178	6.1	2012
75466	1.9	2013
87679	2.2	2014
90728	1.4	2015
82595	4	2016
88082	2	2017

Source: Annual economic reports of the Central Bank of Iraq, different years

#### 4<sup>FO</sup> Measuring the impact of money supply on inflation (applied framework)

The standard model is one of the methods of uploading and interpreting any of the complex economic phenomena. The fundamental objective of formulating models with a range of different economic variables. The standard is to upload and test the validity of economic theory hypotheses. To interpret the relationship between inflation as the "dependent variable" and money supply as the "independent variable", the impact of changing money supply on inflation rates in Iraq's economy must be measured over the period 2003-2017.

This relationship can be expressed by the following simple regression equation:

$$Y_i = b_0 + b_1 X_i + E$$

Where  $Y_i$  is the dependent variable that represents the inflation rate

( $X_i$ ) The independent variable that represents the widespread offer of cash

$b_0, b_1$ ) regression equation transactions.

E Random Error



After uploading the data in table 2 showing the following results: -

Table 2

Money supply (m2) and inflation in Iraq's economy (2003-2017)

MS	INF	year
2,898	32.5	2003
12,254	26.9	2004
14,684	36.9	2005
21,080	53.2	2006
25,014	85.0	2007
26,956	30.8	2008
34,920	2.8-	2009
45,438	2.5	2010
60,386	5.6	2011
72,178	6.1	2012
75,466	1.9	2013
87,679	2.2	2014
90,728	1.4	2015
82,595	0.4	2016
88,082	2.0	2017

**1. Chart: The diagram of the study variables showing MS inflation INF cash is shown to have a time trend of variables and therefore are unstable**



**2. Stabilization Test (Dickie Fuller): To ensure the stability of the variables being studied and for the sake of not getting a false regression, we did Stabilization Test Dickie Fuller on the study variables and it turned out that the two variables are stable at the first difference where the probability value (P- value) for each is less than 5%.**

Null Hypothesis: D(INF) has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
<b>Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic</b>	<b>-3.196022</b>	<b>0.0460</b>
Test critical values:		
1% level	-4.121990	
5% level	-3.144920	
10% level	-2.713751	

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations and may not be accurate for a sample size of 12

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(INF,2)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 12/22/18 Time: 17:36  
 Sample (adjusted): 2006 2017  
 Included observations: 12 after adjustments

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(INF(-1))	-1.282261	0.401205	-3.196022	0.0109
D(INF(-1),2)	0.418755	0.297309	1.408482	0.1926
C	-3.692415	6.384186	-0.578369	0.5772
R-squared	0.555230	Mean dependent var		-0.700000
Adjusted R-squared	0.456393	S.D. dependent var		29.64952
S.E. of regression	21.86051	Akaike info criterion		9.219558
Sum squared resid	4300.936	Schwarz criterion		9.340785
Log likelihood	-52.31735	Hannan-Quinn criter.		9.174676
F-statistic	5.617600	Durbin-Watson stat		2.214898
Prob(F-statistic)	0.026098			

Null Hypothesis: D(MS) has a unit root  
 Exogenous: None  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3)

	t-Statistic	Prob.*
<b>Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic</b>	<b>-1.836437</b>	<b>0.0648</b>
Test critical values:		
1% level	-2.754993	
5% level	-1.970978	
10% level	-1.603693	

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations and may not be accurate for a sample size of 13

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(MS,2)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 12/22/18 Time: 17:37  
 Sample (adjusted): 2005 2017  
 Included observations: 13 after adjustments

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(MS(-1))	-0.405175	0.220631	-1.836437	0.0912
R-squared	0.218085	Mean dependent var		-297.6154
Adjusted R-squared	0.218085	S.D. dependent var		7590.802
S.E. of regression	6712.239	Akaike info criterion		20.53506
Sum squared resid	5.41E+08	Schwarz criterion		20.57851
Log likelihood	-132.4779	Hannan-Quinn criter.		20.52612
Durbin-Watson stat	1.991287			

3. **Estimate Model:** The estimate results showed a reverse correlation between inflation and cash supply in Iraq, but they are very weak. An increase of one unit of cash supply leads to a reduction in inflation by 0.0005. The cash offer explains 45% of changes in inflation according to the R-squared value. The output is moral in impact. The probability value p-value was less than 5%.

Dependent Variable: INF  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 12/22/18 Time: 17:39  
 Sample: 2003 2017  
 Included observations: 15

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
MS	-0.000540	0.000162	-3.327360	0.0055
C	45.61138	9.411193	4.846503	0.0003
R-squared	0.459938	Mean dependent var	18.97529	
Adjusted R-squared	0.418395	S.D. dependent var	25.13080	
S.E. of regression	19.16551	Akaike info criterion	8.867667	
Sum squared resid	4775.116	Schwarz criterion	8.962074	
Log likelihood	-64.50750	Hannan-Quinn criter.	8.866661	
F-statistic	11.07133	Durbin-Watson stat	1.204047	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.005453			

4. **Self-correlation problem:** Self-correlation results show no problem as estimated values fall within the limits of trust.

Date: 12/22/18 Time: 17:40  
 Sample: 2003 2017  
 Included observations: 15

Autocorrelation	Partial Correlation	AC	PAC	Q-Stat	Prob
		1 0.382	0.382	2.6635	0.103
		2 -0.330	-0.557	4.7948	0.091
		3 -0.491	-0.138	9.9112	0.019
		4 -0.285	-0.233	11.794	0.019
		5 0.001	-0.119	11.794	0.038
		6 0.051	-0.319	11.869	0.065
		7 0.084	-0.034	12.094	0.098
		8 0.064	-0.262	12.242	0.141
		9 0.020	-0.119	12.259	0.199
		10 0.037	-0.125	12.330	0.264
		11 -0.006	-0.180	12.332	0.339
		12 -0.011	-0.106	12.342	0.419



**5. Variability problem: The variation test results showed that the estimated protection value of obs R-squared is greater than 5% and therefore the model does not suffer from the problem of variability**

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey

F-statistic	1.429436	Prob. F(1,13)	0.2532
Obs*R-squared	1.485958	Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.2228
Scaled explained SS	2.701967	Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.1002

Test Equation:

Dependent Variable: RESID^2

Method: Least Squares

Date: 12/22/18 Time: 17:41

Sample: 2003 2017

Included observations: 15

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	674.9942	350.7015	1.924697	0.0764
MS	-0.007226	0.006044	-1.195590	0.2532

R-squared	0.099064	Mean dependent var	318.3411
Adjusted R-squared	0.029761	S.D. dependent var	725.0599
S.E. of regression	714.1891	Akaike info criterion	16.10374
Sum squared resid	6630860.	Schwarz criterion	16.19815
Log likelihood	-118.7780	Hannan-Quinn criter.	16.10273
F-statistic	1.429436	Durbin-Watson stat	2.283301
Prob(F-statistic)	0.253210		

## CONCLUSIONS

- 1- The results showed that the morale is weak and negative, i.e. the inverse relationship between inflation (dependent variable) and money (autonomous variable "). This is a contradiction of the operative theory of economic theory, which provides for a foreign relationship. This can be explained by the fact that the Iraqi economy is an unstable economy. Consequently, there are other factors affecting inflation, including the low level of productive activities. This is reflected in a reliance on foreign imports from the so-called imported inflation. .
- 2- Inflation is one of the most serious economic problems affecting various countries, including Iraq, which has social, political and security implications, in particular Iraq's stagnant inflation, which brings together inflation and unemployment.
- 3- The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) was able to reduce inflation rates after 2003 as foreign exchange yields from higher crude oil prices increased.

## Recommendations

- 1- Improve the level of productive activities in the Iraqi economy during the short-term and long-term economic policies, improve the reality of domestic industry and reduce the dependence on imports and their effects on the supply of cash.

- 2- Activating the role of monetary policy in economic life, especially through the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq, as a fundamental need to address economic problems, including inflation.

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**EU Powerlessness**

**Conflicting Perceptions in Response to the War on Gaza**

**Prepared by**



**Dr. Adeeb Ziadeh**  
**Assistant Professor of International Relations**  
**Department of International Affairs/ College of**  
**Arts and Sciences**  
**Qatar University**  
[abader@qu.edu.qa](mailto:abader@qu.edu.qa)

## **Abstract**

This article aimed to scrutinize the EU's cause of powerlessness in dealing with the confrontation, which erupted between the Israeli occupation and Gaza strip in May 2021. Due to the fact that the EU was one of the least actionist external big actors which affected the situation on ground during the war politically and diplomatically, this article tried to interpret this deficiency, as researchers have not tackled it so far. However, in serving this, forty-one EU parliamentary members' speeches (MEPs) have been critically and thoroughly analyzed. Using content analysis, alongside other tools extracted from the realist perspective combined with one of the constructivist theoretical angles, significantly enabled the researcher in analyzing the European politicians' discourses in this regard. It is significantly found that the revisiting EU failure in adequately tackling such an event is attributed to the biased convictions and subjective perceptions that most of the EU politicians hold about the Israeli-Palestinian cause. Conflictual diagnostic perceptions of the MEPs with regard to the exploded situation expressively shown the extent to which divisions amongst politicians have left the EU's diplomacy miserably paralyzed; a matter that confirmed the realists' perspective about the EU foreign policy as it is "nothing more than the combined effort of the member states' foreign policies". Undoubtedly, having unanimity, as a mechanism for foreign policy decision-making, contributed to putting extra burdens on the EU politicians, particularly in the dossier under investigation. Hence, light was shed on MEPs' perspectives regarding the roots of the confrontation, justice against peace, self-defense versus right of resistance and demonization of Hamas contrasted with humanitization of Israel.

**Key words:** Gaza strip, Hamas, Israeli Occupation, self-defense, right of resistance, European parliament, European Union, apartheid

## **Introductory background**

The EU was one of the least actionist external big actors that affected the situation on ground during the Israeli war on Gaza in May 2021. In such an investigation, forty-one EU parliamentary members' speeches (EMPs), the total number of those participated in the special relevant debate conducted in Brussels on 18th May, have been critically analyzed throughout this

study to shed some light on the causal relationship of such EU powerlessness. Using methodology of content analysis in analyzing such official speeches to figure out who said what and why, enabled the investigator to diagnose the revisiting EU failure in dealing with the renewal bloody combats that exploded, on a large scale, four times between 2008 and 2021 in Palestine. The EU position in the last war has not been deeply investigated with referral to its politicians' hegemonic discourse in this regard. Taking into consideration the realist perspective in international relations, combined with a tool borrowed from constructivism, particularly perceptions, such EU negativity in the war will be in question.

Significantly, this article is based on a hypothesis to the effect that internalized perceptions, thoughts and beliefs in the European politicians' mindset about the two parties of the war considerably affected the EU powerlessness. However, powerlessness is meant to be placed here in a consequential context, not a causal framework, and means the absence of actionism where it could be applied, due to implicit and explicit reasons. While many studies digged into determinants of the EU foreign policy, this article chose another way and tried to find out the nature of the political discourse of a representative slice of European politicians serving in one of the EU three pillars, the European parliament, during the war. Consequently, the revisiting EU failure in tackling such an event is attributed to the biased convictions and subjective perceptions that most of the EU politicians hold. However, as far as unanimity is a condition for external political actions as agreed upon in the EU (*Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, art: 26 E*), powerlessness will accompany this entity for a long while and weaken its role in the international arena, especially in Palestine on which the EU's policies are divided.

The EU has crystalized a significant position towards the Arab- Israeli conflict in the aftermath of the evolution of its European Political Cooperation foreign policy instrument in 1970 onward. This came after the 1967 war in which Israel militarily occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The European position founded on the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, in addition to other related UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. Significantly, the then named European Community issued several statements, calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, and to restore the situation as it was on the eve of 1967 war. This progressive position culminated in 1980 when the EC issued its turning point step known as the Venice declaration, recognizing the right of the Palestinians for self-determination,

calling for a negotiated solution between all involved parties including the PLO (*Venice European Council Declaration, 1980*).

Although the EU position was encountered with anger and refusal by Israel and the USA, this perspective prevailed at the end when all parties came together, and put their signature on Oslo agreement in 1993 at the White House garden in Washington D.C. However, the unleashed peace process under the auspices of the USA politically, and the EU economically, passed through without reaching the independent Palestinian state, as according to Oslo agreement, should have been established since May 1999, the end of the interim period (*Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 1994, art: 23*).

Ever since, neither the USA nor the EU could oblige the Israeli occupation to stop its violations of the international law, neglecting the agreements signed with PLO. However, Israel never stopped building settlements, Judaizing Jerusalem, demolishing Palestinians houses, confiscating their land and treating them inhumanly. Furthermore, it launched four wars on Gaza Strip, in addition to other rounds of confrontations in West Bank and Gaza alike (Goldstone, 2009).

Unpardonably, the EU as one of those early players in the Oslo peace process could not keep the latter's momentum alive, apart from the USA. It has not even activated any of its capabilities under its disposal against the well-known violators of international law. Despite dozens of international human rights reports published by European, American and even Israeli human rights' organizations, describing Israel as an apartheid state due to its discriminatory policies against Palestinians, Israel has been faced by nothing but meaningless words of condemnations. On the contrary, strategic relationships between Israel and the EU have been solidated over the last three decades more than ever.

After every failure in accommodating itself with international and human rights law that Israeli occupation falls in, the EU maintains the same rhythm in its reaction, treating the two parties of the equation inconsistently. This was obvious in every war between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian factions in Gaza strip, who have always been blamed for their proscribed (terrorist actions). Incomprehensibly, while the right of Israel for self-defense has always been considered of its legitimate unnegotiable rights, the Palestinian right for resistance against the Israeli occupation, as enshrined in the UNGA resolutions, has never been recognized or taken into account.

(The UNGA) Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle (UN. General Assembly (37th sess.: 1982–1983).

This negligence of the Palestinians' right for armed resistance, as above-mentioned, has been also applicable to the last confrontation between the two sides in May 2021, which lasted for 11 days, causing huge fatalities among innocent people and massive destruction in the Palestinian infrastructure. Although there were many voices heard blaming Israel for its destructive humiliating policies against Palestinians, the mainstream European rhetoric and discourse took side with the Israeli narrative, accusing Hamas for its part in the war. This was always the case in all similar Israeli- Palestinian clashes in 2008, 2012 and 2014.

Significantly, with the eruption of the last war in May 2021 the EU council could not agree on a joint action or even a mere declaration proposed to call for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. As Hungary, benefited from the unanimity tool that is necessary for the EUFP actions, blocked that declaration which was suggested in an online meeting convened by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, the EU officials found twitter and other social media platforms as an alternative tools for expressing their individual opinions, leaving appallingly Gaza Strip under the Israeli horrific fire (Siebold & Emmott, 2021).

Fundamentally, while the EU is considered Israel's biggest trade partner (EU Trade Relations with Israel, n.d.), and the biggest supporting donor for Palestinians, it continued to prove its powerlessness in translating this advantage in achieving any kind of breakthrough in the stalemated peace process or during the war. This inability of acting properly and timely portrays the EU as an entity that does not learn lessons from history on the one hand, and does not improve its political mechanisms on the other, locking itself into a specific narrative that dominates its actions. However, the handcuffed EU foreign policy in this regard considered by realists as an imperative result due to the fact that it is "nothing more than the combined effort of the member states' foreign policies, with EU institutions only able to deliver common denominator-based policies" (Rieker & Giske, 2021). Thus, one state can restrict others' proposed actions in responding to significant events, making the whole entity, when summoned to act, powerless. In mourning its status, MEP Nicola Beer directed his talk to the EU saying,



“we are the institutions, we are politics, we are Europe, and we cannot remain powerless” (Beer, 2021). MEP Jordi Solé understands that the EU might not be “a diplomatic champion, but it certainly has tools to exert leverage, and help the parties move towards a fair and lasting settlement” (Sole, 2021). This powerlessness shows the extent to which the EU’s sway in this dossier is lost and marginalized.

While realists perceive the self-interest of all individual states as the main determinant of the EU decision makers’ actions, the constructivist approach looks at the EU from another perspective. Accordingly, “foreign policy decisions are often made under time and information constraints; involve value-tradeoffs and sunk costs; are influenced by perceptions and misperceptions, images and belief systems, emotions, and internal political and economic calculations; and are shaped by the personality of leaders, miscalculations, agendas, and interests” (Mintz & K., 2010, p169). Therefore, right perceptions and the way decision makers perceive conflicts lead, under certain circumstances, to right policies and vice versa. As a European project established in Palestine, Israel has been seen as a victimized state, and remarkably depicted, for a long time, as a pity target for the so-called Palestinian terrorism. Expressively, this reached its peak after the Hamas movement and other resistance Palestinian factions started to cause some pain for the Israelis from Gaza strip. As long as, the intentional law allows all sorts of resistance in response to military occupation and oppression, the EU pro-Israeli position has been attributed to the Europeans’ interests as perceived and sought by decision makers. As Adeeb Ziadeh labelled it, the West solved the historical Jewish question at the outset of the twentieth century in Palestine once and forever; however, it would not allow this dossier to be reopened again, or to end up, as a result of any existential threat, at the lap of Europe, as it had been before the establishment of Israel (Ziadeh, 2019, p181). Thus, perceptions of European speakers in the EU parliament, which are under analysis herein, reflect the extent to which the EU is incapable of acting in some controversial dossiers, like the one in light.

### **Roots of Confrontation; Far More Than Apparent Causes**

It is commonly known that the confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israelis in May 2021 exploded after the dire clashes between the two parties over the Israeli policies. However, displacement of Palestinians from the long-lived Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem, and

the Israeli attack on the worshippers at Al-Aqsa mosque in Ramadan were in the center of these policies. This Israeli violence, against the international law as perceived by plenty of international human rights organizations, the UN and the EU itself (Silva, 2021), has been the spark that ignited the huge fire, which nearly caused international crisis.

Whereas, it is true that the eviction of Palestinians from Sheikh Jarrah and the attack on worshippers at Al-Aqsa mosque is the apparent reason, the actual reason has been the continuous Israeli ignorance of the Palestinians' rights in living in reasonable human circumstances rather than allowing them to exercise their political rights as enshrined in the international resolutions and agreements. Hence, the world witnessed 11 days of war, in which hundreds of Palestinians lost their lives, added to thousands of lives lost in three subsequent wars waged against Gaza, under the Israeli military strikes in 2008, 2012 and 2014, in addition to massive devastation in the infrastructure (McCarthy, 2021).

Despite the fact that roots of the war were acknowledged by many European speakers, Palestinians, who are solely perceived as launching rockets on Israel, were held responsible for starting it or at least equated with the occupation power itself. According to Augusto Silva,

Many of us have strong views on the proximate causes of this latest conflict. Indeed, the events in Jerusalem during the recent period of the Muslim holy days have been alarming. We were deeply concerned by the clashes at Haram al-Sharif/ Timple Mount. Again, let us be clear: in a city that is home to the three monotheistic religions, all sides must uphold and fully respect the status quo of the holy sites. Freedom of worship and peaceful freedom of assembly must be guaranteed (McCarthy, 2021).

Unequivocally, many MEPs pointed to the party in charge for starting this conflict, neglecting those equating between victims and aggressors. As MEPs Pedro Marques (2021), Jordi Solé (2021), and Andrea Cozzolino (2021) perceived it, the source of this new round of violence could be seen in the increasing number of demolitions, evictions and forced displacement of Palestinians, including in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood (Sant,2021). According to MEP Margrete Auken (2021), the fighting broke out again because of “the siege of Gaza, the brutal occupation of the West Bank, Israel's apartheid regime and the de facto annexation of Palestinian land through continued growth in the illegal settlements” (Auken, 2021).

The Israeli apartheid as described by Auken is a shared perception with other MEPs about the occupation. One of them is MEP Alfred Sant who believed that the Israeli policy, at the end, aims to enclose Palestinians in a Bantustan under Israeli domination, and this cannot be hidden or covered any more (Sant, 2021). The insufficient condemnations of the EU for the Israeli policies, which in reality, as MEP Andrea Cozzolino characterized it, equals negligence of violating the international law, played in favor of Netanyahu's governments; a matter which led to pushing millions of Palestinians to live in an apartheid regime that has produced the latest escalation of violence (Cozzolino, 2021).

The EU is always asked to assume its responsibility by taking a different, more productive and an effective approach to help in putting an end to the Israeli policies and apartheid. Effective mediation and “courageous diplomacy” (Zovko, 2021), according to MEP Manuel Pizarro who shared the same viewpoint with MEP Željana Zovko, should be fueled with energy to open channels of dialogue with all parties of the confrontation seeking a permanent solution (Pizarro, 2021). While Augusto Santos Silva, the speaker on behalf the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called for change in light of the persistent cycle of violence, as he designated it, nothing but condemnations and advices are delivered (Silva, 2021). Instead, as MEP Maria Arena put it, the European Union must use everything in its power to stop the creeping violence of the occupation and apartheid on the Palestinian people, and this for a lasting peace for all (Arena, 2021). In such a way, MEP Idoia Villanueva Ruiz asked the EU to urgently move from declarations to deeds, not only to impose immediate cessation of bombing, but also to put an end to the apartheid and occupation. MEP Ruiz accused the EU for doing nothing but senseless meetings, asking this entity to act firmly and decisively and activate autonomy, independence or a simple strategy against other great powers; this strategy must be based on the fact that if peace is wanted to be achieved, justice has to be established (Ruiz, 2021).

### **Voices for Justice from within the EU Parliament**

Building on MEP Ruiz’s idea, justice should be considerably pursued for the sake of sustainable peace. Justice, in MEP Chris MacManus’ point of view, could be reached when the EU recognizes, in a determined manner, that the conflict, which is taking place in Palestine, is not

between two powerful adversaries but “actually one military power crushing a nation making a stand for their rights, as a sovereign people, to control their own destiny” (MacManus, 2021). According to MEP Marc Botenga, what happened against Gaza was not a cycle of violence, as the EU Council ironically portrays the confrontation; it is an aggressive colonization. Israel is a colonizing state, which for decades, has illegally driving Palestinian out of their homes and “blithely violating a slew of United Nations’ resolutions” (Botenga, 2021). MEP Botenga reminded his MEPs colleagues and the EU Council that the colonization equation, if imposed on any people, the normal reaction would be resistance, and this was what seen in Palestine (Botenga, 2021). In MEP Alfred Sant words, ritual claims that those who resist the Israeli aggressions “are terrorists and anti-Semites no longer hold water” (Sant, 2021). Substantially, according to MEP Hilde Vautmans, as long as “a people is occupied, the resistance to it will continue; as long as a people is treated unequally and unfairly, the resistance will continue. Therefore, such mutual harassment, regardless who has bigger responsibility than the other, between parties will make peace considerably elusive (Vautmans, 2021).

However, exercising the condemnation game, adopting words based actions, and merely calling for ending violence by the EU Council are deceitful policies. The European attempt to show their concern by calling on parties to stop violence is an attempt to rewrite the basic facts of the conflict on ground. Considerably, by decontextualizing the situation between the two parties as if it is between two equal states, which have normal differences on some contested issues, the EU unreasonably contributes in prolonging the conflict. According to MEP Maria Arena, “we are facing an occupier, Israel, and an occupied, the Palestinian people; as international NGOs or even Israeli NGOs like B’Tselem or Yoshi Din have demonstrated, we are facing an apartheid regime” (Arena, 2021); a matter which necessitates a different engagement tactics in dealing with the conflict.

Undoubtedly, as MEP Idoia Villanueva Ruiz termed it, the oppressor remains the oppressor and so does the oppressed. Nevertheless, the reality should not be forgotten that fairness dictates not to equidistant between the two parties, between settlers and colonized. However, Israel is the occupying power, and it should take the lead in ending the root cause of this long lasting conflict for the sake of both peoples, according to Evin Incir. Otherwise, recognition of Palestine state is

the alternative that the EU can take, in response to negligence that Palestinians face, as Evin suggested (Incir, 2021). Unquestionably, every –couple- of -years’ war, or violence, in the EU language, have been built on “decades of international inaction, occupation, blockade, dispossession and human rights violations”; thus, naming things accurately or describing them precisely is highly important in reflecting the reality on ground (Ruiz, 2021).

Accordingly, the EU must stop its only functioning strong-word-policy, stand up for international law, and penalize the illegal settlers. However, the EU should prohibit the entry of their goods, which they produce in the occupied territories. State of Israel, according to MEP Chris, should be referred to the International Criminal Court for its aggressive crimes. If the EU once again stands by, “it buries the viability of a two-state solution and with it any prospect of a fair, peaceful and negotiated settlement” (MacManus, 2021). The EU, as MEP César Luena stresses, should act urgently and decisively to lay the foundations for a true peace process that can achieve a lasting resolution based on the two-state solution, before it becomes materially unfeasible due to the unilateral decisions taken on ground (Luena, 2021). In MEP Botenga’ viewpoint, the association agreement with Israel must be also cancelled because it is, in its reality, an association with apartheid, no less (Botenga, 2021). The EU should exercise the role of leadership and lead, not only comment on events; it is a powerful trading block that needs to activate every tool in its disposal to stop the Israeli destructive policies against Palestinians, including targeted sanctions and reevaluation of the Association agreement with Israel, as MEP Grace O’Sullivan called for (O’Sullivan, 2021) .

In the same context, MEP Andrea Cozzolino, wanted to appear more balanced and equidistantly, called for sanctions and pressure to be imposed on the two sides, Netanyahu and Hamas. He continued asking the EU to stand for human rights and put an end to nihilism; it should not limit itself to condemnations of actions from both sides, but to find a way forward based on the two-state solution; inaction as Andrea said, will expose the EU to unbearable hypocrisy (Cozzolino, 2021). By such inaction and silence, many European states, as MEP Grace O’Sullivan commented, give tacit approval to the unbalanced Israeli onslaughts against Palestinians (O’Sullivan, 2021). MEP Jordi Solé was very clear when he drew his colleagues’ attention to the fact that ceasefire was not enough, and if the situation left without permanent solution, the

instability would repeatedly come back. Expressively, the underlying problems represented in the injustice on the ground, that the international community does not sufficiently recognize, must be addressed once and for all (Solé, 2021).

This discourse significantly met by several speakers like MEP Tonino Picula, who called for a compromise (Picula, 2021), and MEP Michal Šimečka, who asserted that there is no shortcut solutions to peace and stability, such as Abraham Accords (Šimečka, 2021). These accords do not pave the way for permanent and just solution. In the same context, Augusto Santos Silva, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy called for looking beyond that round of fight, and “to restore the political horizon towards a negotiated two-state solution”, acknowledging that the status quo in Gaza is fundamentally unsustainable (Silva, 2021). However, when he calls upon the two parties for reestablishment of the peace process based on a negotiated two-state solution, what the EU has done to make this choice achievable. It kept funding the Palestinian Authority and recording the Israeli violations of international law without sufficient actions.

Other MEPs called the EU and the international community to step forward and assume their responsibilities in this regard without hesitation (Marques, 2021). MEP Alfred Sant directed his speech to the EU to be courageous and frankly and honestly say where responsibilities lie in such a conflict. He called Europe to “give up political sleepwalking, get out of the comfortable slipstream of the USA, start conversations with legitimate contacts, break the asymmetry between democracy and the rule of law on the one hand and Hamas terror on the other” (Sant, 2021). Instead, the EU should feel sick of being scandalized by massacres perpetrated by Israelis in a shameful negligence of the Palestinians as human beings, according to MEP Javier Nart.

Hence, solution, as termed by Nart, is not ceasefire until the next confrontation, but termination of a long occupation, and full recognition of Palestinians as human beings (Nart, 2021). This cry met by another one delivered by MEP Željana Zovko, who warned the EU from the history court that will question the absence of those so-called peacemakers and visionaries (Zovko, 2021). Israel will not be able to only rely on its military power. Unquestionably, “when Tel Aviv is within missiles’ range and the Iranians have amassed stockpiles of weapons on its borders”, it

should be worried if eternal peace for all has not been urgently reached, according to MEP Bernard Guetta (Guetta, 2021). In MEP Martina Michels words, rights of Palestinians and security of Israel are inextricably interrelated (Michels, 2021). If Palestinians do not have their rights, Israel will not enjoy either security or peace. Considerably, leaving the conflict ignited without resolution jeopardizes not only the Palestinians and Israelis, but also the Middle East security and stability, which are very necessary for preventing further migration waves towards Europe, according to MEP Kinga Gál (2021) Thus, dealing with the conflict in a shortsighted way will lead to more sophistications in the future; a matter that dictates a long-term solution that guarantees stability and security alongside Palestinian rights as internationally sustained.

### **Israel's Self Defense versus Palestinian's**

Another aspect of support Israel always receives from the Europeans is justifying or understanding its aggressions under the umbrella of self-defense. As explained by MEP Charlie Weimers, Europeans support Israel against terrorists who seek its annihilation (Weimers, 2021). As Eradication of Israel is the other's target means that Israel does nothing against Palestinians but defending its mere existence; a matter that is enough for the Europeans to accept the Israeli aggressions in principle. In this context, the only thing catches the Europeans' eyes as usual is the proportionality of the violence that Israel executes in its attacks on Palestinians. Therefore, the EU has never condemned Israel's strikes frankly and clearly as strong as it does with Palestinians; when the matter comes to Israel, the generic formulas used in the EU's discourse, while a different frank language used against Hamas and other Palestinian factions based on condemnations, stigmatization and convictions.

This was very evident during the last confrontation between the two sides in May 2021. According to Augusto Santos Silva, representing the EU council and commission, Israel has "an unequivocal right of self-defense, defense of its territory and defense of its population" (Silva, 2021) but this should be proportionate and in compliance with international humanitarian law (Šimečka, 2021). Hence, Israel, in Silva shared point of view with MEP César Luena (2021), has the full right to protect its civilian population, though it is the occupation power. Nevertheless, what is the case regarding the Palestinian people, as Luena asked? Do they have the same right of protection and defense for themselves when they are subject to a colonial occupation? Silva

never mentioned their absolute right of resistance, which he definitely knows that it is part of the international law. MEP Alexandr Vondra believes that “Israel, our key democratic ally in the Middle East, must, like all sovereign states, defend its citizens from rocket attacks by Palestinian terrorists”, accusing those so called terrorists of being sponsored by Iran, and aiming to destroy the State of Israel (Vondra, 2021). Likewise, there is no mention of Palestinians as people, who also have every right to defend themselves in the face of the Israeli occupation.

Another MEP David McAllister, shares MEP Anna Bonfrisco her perspective, considering that “Israel has a right, and Israel has a duty to defend its citizens against terror attacks” (McAllister, 2021). It is true that he, or other speakers, like MEP Željana Zovko (2021), keeps reminding Israel of acting with restraint according to the international humanitarian law, but never saw the Palestinians in the same way. However, Palestinians, who face the Israeli occupation and defend themselves in this context, are not perceived other than terrorists without a duty or a right to fight for their freedom, and liberation of themselves from the last and the longest occupation in the modern history. MEP Michael Gahler directed his call to Hamas, asking it firstly to stop its rockets from its side, and then Israel would stop its attacks (Gahler, 2021), as if Hamas ironically is the occupying power that started that round of fight, and paradoxically as if Israel is the one who lives under the Hamas occupation. In his assertion of the Israeli self-defense right, MEP Hermann Tertsch condemned questioning Israel by politicians and media for its part in the battle. In his estimation, problems absurdly start when “Israel, as a democratic state, begins to defend itself and every right in the world for self-defense; it will always defend itself, and is being able to do so” (Tertsch, 2021). MEP Lukas Mandl considered questioning the Israeli strikes on Gaza Strip as doubting its mere existence, refusing to accept simply such a debate (Mandl, 2021). In this regard, Israel always receives full solidarity from European politicians and this, according to MEP Kinga Gál, should not be in doubt under any circumstances (Gál, 2021)

Supporting Israel, in Europeans’ perceptions, should not be merely lip service. MEP Jörg Meuthen, believes that unlike for many others, Israel should be shown unbreakable solidarity in its fight for its “inalienable right to exist”. Even if Israel left nothing for Palestinians but anger and despair as MEP Alfred Sant (2021) said, this solidarity, according to Meuthen, must be extended to Jewish people wherever they are in the world to protect their freedom of life,



especially in the holy land (Meuthen, 2021). In MEP Sergey Lagodinsky argument, Europeans had decades of their time to respect and maintain human rights, but at time of war, the EU “moral duty” is related to existence of Israel, which should not be subject to compromise or reservation (Lagodinsky, 2021).

Linking self-defense to anti-Semitism is another way of showing solidarity with Israel. Significantly, the confrontation has been placed in the anti-Semitism-self-defense context, stigmatizing Palestinians and their supporters in the world with this accusation. MEP Reinhard Bütikofer considered Israeli self-defense one of its core rights, condemning demonstrations that erupted throughout the world supporting Palestinians and chanting against the war ( Bütikofer, 2021). However, MEP David McAllister, tried to link speech of hatred and anti-Semitism to the people who set to streets in the world, especially in Europe, against the war on Gaza, calling for punishment with full force of law for those involved in such rallies (McAllister, 2021). MEP Jérôme Rivière considered these pro-Palestinian demonstrations as anti-Zionist demonstrations with worrying aspects of clear anti-Semitism discourse, which are led by “Islam-leftisit” parties. However, due to the European tragic history of anti-Semitism, he called for “fighting with the greatest firmness and without any hesitation, ever” against such manifestations on European streets (Rivière, 2021).

Defaming pro-Palestinian demonstrations continued by many MEPs during the war on Gaza. MEP Michael Gahler depicted what Israel faces on streets of Europe as what the Jewish people faced by old Nazis, accusing people from Islamic background of reviving the speech of hatred without knowing its subsequent consequences (Gahler, 2021). Likewise, MEP Frédérique Ries called the EU for strengthening not only its discourse against allegations of anti-Semitic pro-Palestinian rallies, but also for consolidating its legislations against such on-streets-movements, internet networks and other hatred platforms (Ries, 2021).

Criticism of Israel on Europe’s streets arbitrarily equalized with anti-Jewish behaviors and actions. Peaceful demonstrations led by activists everywhere, as a message of protest against the Israeli crimes in Gaza and Jerusalem, illogically portrayed by MEP Jörg Meuthen as anti-Jewishness, and accordingly Israel is subject to terrorism because of such “hatred-motivated

peacefulness”. Having the public opinion throughout the world stood for Palestine during the war made it difficult for supporters of Israel to comprehend the shock, describing the pro-Palestinian stance as a coalition consisted of “left-wing, green and Islamic anti-Semitism that – packaged as criticism of Israel”, while it is, in reality, a terror against it (Meuthen, 2021).

This kind of discourse shared by many speakers like MEPs Željana Zovko (2021), Nicola Beer (2021), Sergey Lagodinsky (2021), and Reinhard Bütikofer (2021). They are clearly obsessed by anti-Semitism based condemnations of those doing nothing but chanting slogans for Palestine in light of the Israeli occupation’s aggressions. However, they consider those rallies rigorously intolerable, and in full contradiction with the reality of Israel in the European mindset as a democratic state, or in MEP Hermann Tertsch’s words, “a bulwark of democracy and all European democracies”, that is always under terrorist attacks (Tertsch, 2021). This matter, according to them makes Israel merits supporting not condemnations, especially at times of war. Mourning Europe for the changing public opinion regarding Palestine represented in what MEP Nicola Beer considered the biggest anti-Semitic rallies that took place in favor of the Palestinians’ cause; “these unprecedented scenes affect the unity of Europeans and coexistence amongst society” (Beer, 2021). Having them said so, anti-Semitism shall not be interposed in all pro Palestinians’ supportive activities, and freedom of expression must be respected as one the EU normative principles, regardless of the status of Israel in the European’s mindset.

## **Demonization of Hamas versus Humanitirization of Israel**

In Europeans’ perceptions, Hamas and other Palestinian factions are merely perceived as rockets’ shooters without a legal cause of resistance or a right to fight. However, in almost all the speeches delivered in the EU parliament during the war on Gaza in May 2021, Hamas is portrayed as a terrorist organization, which stands behind all turbulence witnessed there. Accordingly, denunciations and condemnations always directed to the movement, which, in reality, does nothing, according to Palestinians, but reacting to the Israeli occupation that spares no effort in violating Geneva international treaties as many international human rights’ reports documented. Responsibilities of maintaining rights of the occupied Palestinians are legally and internationally laid on Israel as an occupying power. However, these responsibilities have not

ever been respected, or taken seriously by the Israeli occupation. Thus, having people standing for their rights according to the international law, should be, if not appraised, at least recognized by the EU, especially that the latter defines itself as a normative power driven by norms and values (Amnesty International, 2022).

Defaming Hamas is one of the MEPs constants. According to a big number of them, this armed movement perceived as indiscriminately kill civilians and does not care about its people since it hides behind inhabitants and makes of them human shields. It is significantly fueled and provided with arms, and financially supported by Iran which seeks Israel's eradication, according to MEPs speakers. Additionally, the education textbooks under its authority contain anti-Semitic subjects and incitement against Israel. In contrast, Israel is not a terrorist or apartheid state; it is a democratic state which share the same values of the Europeans. MEP Željana Zovko considered that "civilians in Israel are being exposed to indiscriminate firing of rockets by Hamas and other terrorist groups", whereas Israel has not been stigmatized with indiscriminate killing of civilians in Gaza (Zovko, 2021). Similarly, MEP Augusto Santos Silva was very firm when condemned the indiscriminate launching of Hamas's rockets whereas kept very cautious when talked about the Israeli airstrikes that targeted pure civilian goals (Silva, 2021).

Good- guy –bad- guy depiction is another way differently used when describing both sides by MEPs speakers. Good-guy, who finds himself obliged to violently defend his people, to unintentionally kill other side's civilians and even to coincidentally launch wars, always represented by the occupying power, while the bad - guy is paradoxically represented by Hamas which is supposed to be the seen as resistance movement under occupation. Hence, Israel, the good, tries its effort to avoid harming civilians and even "warns them ahead of its military strikes", according to MEP Carmen Avram. At the same time, Hamas and other Palestinian groups, in Avram's point of view, commit double war crimes when they kill the Israeli civilians, and use the Palestinian civilians as human shields (Avram, 2021). Likewise, MEP Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou who believes that Israel, the good-guy, "goes to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties on either side", while the bad guy, Hamas, keeps firing on the Israeli civilians and use the Palestinian children as human shields. However, Hamas not only does this but also, according to her, stockpiles weapons in mosques and schools, "uses hospitals as strongholds and

kills mindlessly”. She enthusiastically recommended proclaiming Hamas, by the EU, as a global threat and utterly amoral (Asimakopoulou, 2021).

Hamas is the one who should be held responsible for the May-2021 confrontation in Europeans’ perceptions. As concluded by MEP Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, the military conflict was a result of the Palestinian incitement, financed by the Iranians, and not a result of the Israeli aggressions. Anna failed to remember the Israeli eviction of Palestinians from Jerusalem, the attack on worshippers in Al-Aqsa mosque, and at top of that the illegal continuous occupation of Palestine for decades, in a stark violation of primary rudiments of international law. Unbelievably, the only thing she noticed was the Hamas’s thousands of rockets fired on Israel, while kept blind from watching the Israeli bloody attacks, and war crimes committed by it, as named by MEP Michael Lynk, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. Significantly, the latter accused Israel of imposing apartheid upon Palestine in a post-apartheid age, in addition to committing war crimes against Palestinians (OHCHR, 2022). However, Europeans in this regard ignored all human rights reports dedicated for accusing Israel of different kinds of violations of Palestinians’ rights. Instead, they recruited themselves in a demonization and vilification campaign concentrated on Hamas, the “bad guy”, accusing it of having a dedication to murder Jewish people and “raze Israel”, the “good-guy”, “the liberal democracy that is committed to the rule of law”, as portrayed by Asimakopoulou (2021).

Other speakers hold the same perception about the background of such a military fight. For example, MEP Jörg Meuthen expressed his deep shock because of the “rockets’ terror”, considering it huge aggression on the Israeli people (Meuthen, 2021), ignoring to reflect on the devastation witnessed in Gaza as a result of the Israeli weaponries. In the same way, MEP Charlie Weimers asked whether there is any democratic country tolerates thousands of rockets targeting its streets, allows calls of glorifying terrorism against its people, and accepts internationally recognized terrorist organization to attack its soil (Weimers, 2021). Charlie did not ask the same question about whether there is any occupied people for more than 70 years accept the occupation terrorism day and night, tolerate aggressions on children, women, pure civilian targets, and above all renunciation of their right for self- determination.

Commitment to democracy and civil and political rights make Europeans firm in supporting Israel against terrorism. According to MEP Pina Picierno, Europeanism and Atlanticism jointly necessitate steady assertion of an unequivocal commitment to democracy and rule of law, in addition to a clear response for peace and democracy against terrorism and hatred. Accordingly, “the Middle East is the geographical border of the West in which Israel is its democratic border” (Picierno, 2021). In response to this point, MEP Javier Nart asserted that nothing justifies the Israeli killing of Palestinian civilians and children, nothing excuses bombing an occupied city, and this is not an act of democracy; however, it is hypocrisy (Nart, 2021). Contrary to this perspective, MEP Lukas Mandl confirms that Israel stood with European democracies when terrorists attacked them, and as such, Europeans should stand with the democracy and rule of law-based Israel when terrorists attack it (Mandl, 2021).

Continuing in the same context of demonization of Hamas and humanization of Israel, MEP Antonio López-Istúriz White criticized those of the MEPs for what he described “hypocritical confusion” regarding the nature of the conflict, considering that the war is not between Israel and Palestine, but between a democratic state, and a terrorist organization, sponsored by the Iranian regime, and has taken the Palestinians in Gaza strip as hostages and human shields (White, 2021). Similarly, MEP Anna Bonfrisco, on behalf of the ID group, commended Israel for its capabilities to build “a mutual understanding and coexistence; it knows how to respect human dignity and freedoms, including religious freedom; Israel has an inclusive and pluralistic society; it is a champion of science and technology” (Bonfrisco, 2021).

On contrast, the other side is nothing but a terrorist organization who knows nothing but shooting rockets and causing deaths amongst civilians. In MEP Željana Zovko's standpoint, Hamas, the perpetrators of the conflict, invests in rockets while some people invests in vaccines against the pandemic which increasingly takes more human victims than wars, causing sorrow and fear (Zovko, 2021). MEP Carmen Avram joined his colleagues in attacking Hamas, stigmatizing it for being on the European terrorism blacklist; it cares about itself, power and keeping the Palestinians under its hold, causing devastation and deaths in Israel and Gaza. Avram asserted that Hamas's goal is to destroy Israel, not to liberate its land or defend its people, and to keep the Middle East in a constant state of chaos (Avram, 2021). He never came across

the Palestinian suffering because of the Israeli missiles targeting Gaza infrastructure, and causing deaths amongst innocent civilians. Blatantly, he did not only turned the reality upside down but also did not pay attention to all cries came out of Gaza when it was under attack, as if they are not human beings. Taking part in the demonization campaign against the Palestinian resistance, MEP Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou accused Hamas of, what she said, calling for genocide of Jews and murdering civilians, while she did not pay attention to international reports which condemned Israel of committing massacres and genocide against Palestinians in many occasions (Asimakopoulou, 2021).

Adoption of the Israeli narrative by some MEPs constituted a significant part in tolerating, if not justifying, its missile attacks on Palestinians. MEP Ilana Cicurel accused Hamas of trapping Israel by placing its command centers, weapon caches, and rockets shooters in mosques, schools and hospitals; a matter, which makes civilians susceptible to Israeli retaliation (Cicurel, 2021). Hence, Hamas is the one who kills Palestinian hope and peace, and not Israel, as MEP Frédérique Ries termed it (Ries, 2021). Significantly, “Iran and Hamas sponsor terrorism, hatred and resentment; they are enemies of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and human dignity”, as designated by MEP Anna Bonfrisco (2021). Whereas she portrayed Hamas in such a way, Israel has not received same criticism regardless who is right and who is wrong. This kind of denunciation was joined by MEP Augusto Santos Silva, who delivered his “unequivocal condemnation, without any ambiguity,” of the launching of rockets by the terrorist organization against the residents of Israel (Silva, 2021). This clarity and strength in conviction has not been the same when talking about the Israeli part in the war, which shows the double standard policy in its naked reality.

Incitement by some European speakers against Hamas never stopped. MEP Alexandr Vondra, called on the EU commission to stop financing Palestinian organizations that directly or indirectly end up in the service of Hamas (Vondra, 2021). This matter means, if applied, that all kinds of financial assistance would stop, because in a way or another it helps easing the humanitarian status in Gaza strip, which makes the rule of Hamas easier.

## Conclusion

It is obvious that the MEPs were divided over the war which waged on Gaza in May 2021. However, after four wars in less than 15 years between Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance factions, substantial sounds started to voice their convictions among European politicians. Significantly, vocabularies like Israeli apartheid, colonization, resistance, justice and the EU powerlessness started to echo under the dome of the European parliament, causing disturbance and anger to the opposite pro-Israelis' majority. Yet, nearly 46 of those speakers whose speeches were analyzed have something in common based on supporting Israel in the face of so-called terrorism with some reservations. On the other hand, using terminologies like anti-Semitism, terrorism, self-defense, democratic Israeli state, genocide of Jews, murdering civilians and Hamas rockets have shown the extent to which these conceptions are impeded in the mindset of Europeans.

Significantly, vocabularies and their derivatives that speakers used in their speeches were highly reflective and revealing. Israel had its name mentioned about 170 times during the debate, while Palestine used around 90 times; a matter that tells a lot about the real European concern regarding the war. At the same time, Hamas has been associated with terrorism about 40 times for each term, which also means a lot about how Europeans perceive Palestinian factions engaged in defending their people. Likewise, Hamas "rockets" stated more than 20 times, whereas Israeli "missiles" that left huge devastation and fatalities in Gaza Strip used only 3 times. On the same level, Israeli "self- defense" terminology used 28 times while Palestinian "resistance" cited only 5 times. Similarly, speakers referred to "Jews" 13 times and "anti-Semitism" 20 times while the word "Muslim" was only mentioned twice and in a materialistic context. Other terminologies were used in the same biased manner, confirming the preconceptions about the nature of the conflict and the determinants of the European discourse.

Accordingly, the EU powerlessness in its foreign policy towards the Palestinian- Israeli cause is a man-made choice and not a built-in factor. However, if the EU wanted to activate what it has in its hands in pressuring the Israeli government to stop the war on Gaza, or to end its illegal occupation, it would find many things to be done in this regard. Given the fact that the EU has easily deployed its capabilities in confronting Russia because of its war on Ukraine, by sanctions, means that it can do so in the case of the Israeli occupation. As far as Europeans are convinced

that sanctions on one case can work, then sanctions should also work on the other. Additionally, having the EU is divided over many aspects of the conflict that left the EUPF paralyzed and rhetorically driven, unanimity that is strictly necessary for external political actions will be unattainable. Hence, Divisions amongst MEPs about roots and manifestations of the war reflect the same level of differences amongst decision makers in the EU; a matter that interprets the lower level of influence that the EU could exert or the diplomacy it executed.

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
**NO. 16**

**The impact of US sanctions on Iran and their impact on the Iraqi  
economy for the period 2010-2019 and the role of the resistance  
economy in resolving these effects**

**Prepared by**



**A.Prof-Dr. Mohamad Bidar**  
**Department of Economics**  
[Gh-asaman@yahoo.com](mailto:Gh-asaman@yahoo.com)



**Najlah shamoon shlaymoon**  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[nashch70@gmail.com](mailto:nashch70@gmail.com)



**Ahmed Jabbar Shaye**  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[ajab98512@gmail.com](mailto:ajab98512@gmail.com)



**Maram Albusharbe**  
PhD student in the Department of Economics  
[maramalbushrby@gmle.com](mailto:maramalbushrby@gmle.com)

## **Abstract**

Iraq, being one of Iran's western neighbours, has played and continues to play a significant role in the country's non-oil exports, particularly amid the country's sanctions. With \$9 billion in non-oil exports in 2019, Iraq was the second-largest destination for Iranian goods. However, the process of US sanctions on Iran and their negative impact on it, as well as the unilateral trade between Tehran and Baghdad, are all issues that threaten Iran's exports to Iraq. On this basis, it seems that a new approach to trade relations with Iraq, as well as improving export operations, can contribute to stabilizing and strengthening trade relations between Iran and Iraq.

**Keywords:** Economic diplomacy ; Economic Relations; Economic development; Balance of Payments.

## **Introduction**

Iraq and Iran enjoy excellent relations rooted in the cultural and sectarian ties between the two peoples and the vast borders between the two countries. The past of this relationship has been since the Iranian Government's recognition of the Iraqi Government in 1929 and the nature and characteristics of this relationship have varied according to the reality of successive historical stages. The outcomes of Iraq's 2003 liberation have built a solid and multi-pillar base economically, socially, culturally, security and politically between the two countries.

Iraq considers Iran's eastern gateway to the Arab world, the geostrategic link linking the Arab world to Asia. In addition to the Iraqi-Turkish-Iranian geostrategic triangle, as well as Iran's strategic projects and the pursuit of a direct neighbour with Europe through a hub passing through Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, In terms of area, Iraq is one-quarter of Iran's, and in terms of population density, Iraq has half of Iran's population census.

## **Research problem:**

The Iraqi economy is characterized as an import consumer renter with a privilege that depends entirely on the export of crude oil and the proceeds from its sale in the world market, which is the main source of the country's economy. Therefore, the search attempts to answer the following questions humbly:

Should the Iraqi government abide by the US sanctions imposed on Iran, and what are the monetary policy measures to cope with changes in prices (inflation and exchange rate) as a result of the import gap caused by the interruption of Iran's imports?

## **Search objective**

The research aims to demonstrate the possibility of finding solutions to save the Iraqi economy from the effects of any sanctions imposed on neighbouring countries with which Iraq has trade relations.

## **Research importance**

Iraq is one of the best export markets for Iran as economic exchanges between the two countries have led to new advanced stages for Tehran to devote a major trading partner to Baghdad ", a vital rehabilitation relationship that has known qualitative leaps after 2003, Having been at its lowest level before Iraq's liberation in 2003, the Iraqi market was initially not responsive to the requirements of trade with Iran and the desire in this area was limited, The market was open to Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and trade between Iran and Iraq was only \$1 billion. The Committee for the Development of Economic Relations between the Two Countries was established after the Prime Minister of Iraq's visit to Iran in 2006, The volume of trade has increased gradually, providing great opportunities to invest in various industrial and tourism fields between the two countries..

## **Research Methodology**

The extrapolation and extrapolation method has been used to investigate the capabilities of reform and the importance of its implementation in the banking system, based on references from relevant books, reports, research and the global information network.

## **Research Structure**

Research Department to three investigators included the first research (the development of Iraqi-Iranian trade relations for 2010-2019) and the second research standard analysis of the impact of U.S. sanctions on Iran on the Iraqi economy. The third examined the role of the resistant economy in addressing the effects of America's sanctions on Iran on the Iraqi economy.

### **1<sup>st</sup>. Development of Iraqi-Iranian trade relations in 2010-2019**

Iraq has become an open market for the import of various goods, coming from multiple arising primarily from Iran after 2003, and Iraq's extreme openness to import has come in the context of new economic data, including the absence of tariffs on goods; (which was subsequently imposed by the Iraqi Government), including the deterioration of Iraq's State and civil industrial sector, the closure of most production plants and workshops due to the absence of electricity and fuel and the poor security situation, which made Iraq dependent on import in the first place (Al-Jabouri, 2016).

The Iraqi market is now unprepared to reduce import dependence, and here comes the role of the Iranian partner, which most Iraqi traders prefer to deal with, because of Iran's alignment with Iraq on the one hand, which reduces transportation and shipping costs, as well as because Iran's industry is well developed and quality compared to the Iraqi alternative and other alternatives. This order is touched with electrical devices, including Iranian air coolers, which fully capture the Iraqi market, in various types and brands, all of which are manufactured in Iranian civil factories and exported specifically to Iraq (Ahmed, 2006). Also with building materials of



cement, armament iron, brick etc. It expands to include clothing, medicines and various medical devices, as well as dairy, milk derivatives and canned food. which is slightly competed by Kuwaiti and Saudi canned food (Brihi, 2017).

Iran is currently the strongest economic partner in Iraq, and it is difficult to imagine the Iraqi market without Iranian goods that meet the basic needs of the Iraqi consumer with trade inequality between the two countries. Iraq now exports little to Iran and other nations, importing everything from Iran to oil derivatives and electricity (Al-Shazali, 2017).

Iraq shares a geographical boundary of about 1,458 km. There is a range of border crossings between the two countries, such as Al-Shayeb, Al-Salamah, Zarabatiyah, Al-Manzaria, Mandali and Haj Amran and Bashmakh outlets. In addition, air transport activity contributes to the transport of goods and services between the two countries. The country's trade movement in both imports and exports has developed considerably after 2003 and to the two countries. With all the security turmoil that has ravaged Iraq over the past five years, the trade relationship between Iraq and Iran has maintained an escalating pace, as Iranian and Iraqi trucks have not stopped crossing from the southern crossings of Manzarieh and Salameh (Maalla, 2008).

### **Iraq's commodity trade with neighboring countries**

After 2003, through its moderate positions, Iraq demonstrated its commitment to the policy of constructive cooperation, open bridges and improved relations with neighbouring States by adopting a balanced policy in its regional relations devoted to a new phase of relations and a common desire to strengthen cooperation and joint coordination, develop intraregional trade and its markets and encourage investment.

Trade volume varies with neighbouring countries (Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria) For the duration of the topic, table (1), it fluctuates between rising and declining, as the volume of trade with neighbouring countries recorded the volume of trade with the outside world as its slowest percentage in 2010 (4.1%). In 2011, the highest percentage (47.2%) declined. (15.8%) 2012 to rise back to (31.1%) in 2013 and retreat to (15.6%) 2015 to return to (20.8%) 2015 to decline to (17.5%) and (12%) in 2016 and 2017 went back up to 33.4% in 2018 to fall back to 21.7% in 2019 (Al-Jabouri, 2016).

Table (1)  
Volume of trade with neighbouring countries to volume of trade with world countries  
million dinars

<b>Volume of exchange with Iran to volume of exchange with neighbouring</b>	<b>The volume of Iraq's trade with neighbouring countries to the volume of foreign trade</b>	<b>Volume of Iraq's trade with countries around the world</b>	<b>Volume of Iraq's trade with neighbouring countries</b>	<b>Volume of Iraq's trade with Iran</b>	<b>The year</b>
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(%) countries with the world  
(%)

1.2	4.1	5,955,317.75	244,096.80	2,888.45	2010
0.3	47.2	2,829,556.30	1,335,027.70	3,729.71	2011
1.5	15.8	18,541,366.49	2,932,693.40	45,039.28	2012
6.4	31.1	30,668,762.21	9,540,984.18	612,350.27	2013
13.6	15.6	54,301,463.80	8,444,401.99	1,151,108.24	2014
12.7	20.8	22,707,783.40	4,729,757.61	600,098.17	2015
15.0	17.5	33,691,699.90	5,910,267.40	888,055.80	2016
15.3	12.0	38,171,724.50	4,572,341.30	701,636.60	2017
16.6	33.4	46,135,535.10	15,410,103.80	2,554,861.00	2018
18.7	21.7	55,110,012.90	11,941,153.31	2,228,439.49	2019

Source: GLOBAL ECONOMIC INDICATORRE DATA,2018.

With regard to the volume of trade with Iran as measured by the volume of trade with neighbouring countries, Table 1 notes its trend of rising from 2014 to 2019, where the record is higher at 18.7% (Money and Banks, 1990).

## 2<sup>nd</sup>. Benchmark analysis of the impact of US sanctions on Iran on Iraq's economy

Iraq is linked to economic and political relations with Iran as a neighbouring State of Iraq. These relations have direct and indirect effects on Iraq's economy. Any event, whether economic or political, is likely to move to Iraq. In this study, we will focus on measuring the impact of US sanctions on Iran and their impact on the Iraqi economy by dividing the research into the first two parts dealing with the scenario of Iraq's non-compliance with US sanctions on Iran, Part II deals with Iraq's commitment to sanctions and the boycott of Iran by building four standard models in Part I: Index of Iraqi dinar exchange rate and inflation rate of affiliated variables Iraq's total imports, the time-lag Iraqi dinar exchange rate and the time-lag inflation rate are the independent variables through which the impact of US sanctions on Iran will move to the Iraqi economy if Iran is not boycotted. non-implementation of sanctions, while in part II the exchange rate of Iraqi dinars and the inflation rate of affiliated variables s import gap from Iran to its total imports and the rate of underdeveloped inflation are the independent variables in the case of the province of Iran [4]. The following is a description of the range of variables in the standard models:

## 1. Description of model variables

This aspect of the study deals with measuring and analysing the impact of Iranian sanctions on the Iraqi economy for the period 2010-2019 by adopting some recent tests and standard models related to the analysis of time chains. Before entering into the standard analysis we must give a definition of the symbols used in the standard analysis as shown in table (2).

Table (2)  
Codes used in standard analysis

variable	symbol
Exchange rate of Iraqi dinar against the United States dollar in the current year in Parallel Market	et
Current year's inflation rate	pt
Iraq's total income in the current year	Mt
Iraq's total imports are deducted from Iran in the current year	mt

Source: Prepared by researchers

## 2. Presentation and analysis of standard model results

Before conducting statistical estimates of Iraq's economic models, it must be noted that Iraq is experiencing special economic conditions, which sometimes makes most estimates contrary to the logic of economic theory and its basic mandates. Researchers have estimated some standard models reflecting the impact of U.S. sanctions on Iran on the Iraqi economy through the following:

### A. Failure to abide by US sanctions on Iran:

The impact of Iraq's non-compliance with sanctions against Iran and the maintenance of economic relations can be measured by two measurement models (Fattah, 1986):

A. Measuring the impact of total imports on the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar, the model takes the following description:

$$et = f(Mt) \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

The above model examines Iranian-Iraqi economic relations expressed in imports (Mt) and their impact on the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar in the parallel market. Before estimating the relationship above, several tests must be carried out as follows: -

The first step in analyzing the data of economic variables prepared for estimation is to conduct a unit root test to determine the stability of time chains, to avoid the false results of the small squares method and to obtain meaningful economic explanations, and the results of tests indicate through the application of the expanded Dickie Fuller test (ADF) The time chains of economic variables (Mt, Et) have not all stabilized at the same level, as the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar

has stabilized at the level and flatly at the morale level (% 0.5), so we reject the H0 hypothesis that indicates the lack of stability of time chains and accept the H1 hypothesis that suggests otherwise. Total revenues (Mt) were found to have not stabilized at the level and morale level (% 5). Therefore, the unit root test was conducted in the first teams of the original series, where it was stable at the morale level (% 5) and with a definite presence.

With regard to the analysis of the results of the self-degradation model (VAR) Vector autoregressive estimates, the optimal slowing period of the estimated model prior to an estimate (VAR) was investigated by the seekers, since the optimal slowing period was one time period (one time gap) depending on the two criteria (LR, FPE), which corresponds to the lowest value. The estimated relationship between total imports and the Iraqi dinar exchange rate after the optimal slowing period was:

$$et = 457.9 + 0.6 et_{-1} + 1.6 Mt_{-1} \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

$$t = (2.3) \quad (3.7) \quad (1.5)$$

$$R^2 = 0.67 \quad , R^2 \text{ adj} = 0.58$$

$$F^* = 8.02$$

The above model shows that the increase in the exchange rate of the previous year's Iraqi dinar (et-1) (1 unit likely to increase the current year's Iraqi dinar exchange rate by 0.6) (With the stability of other factors), the increase in the rate of exchange of the Iraqi dinar in the previous year is likely to continue in effect for the current year if the reasons for the increase in foreign currency demand continue, and the increase in total imports lagging behind in time (Mt-1) By one unit, the current year's Iraqi dinar exchange rate will be increased by 1.6 because imports need foreign currency to be covered and therefore demand for this currency will increase, resulting in higher Iraqi dinar exchange rate, The explanatory power of  $R^2$  indicates that both the underdeveloped Iraqi dinar exchange rate and the lagging total imports affect the current year's Iraqi dinar exchange rate by a 67% ratio means that the independent variables (Mt-1,et-1) affects the dependent variable of imports by 67%) and the rest 33%) is due to a number of other factors that did not enter the estimated model. The value of the  $R^2$  modulator, which is more accurate than the  $R^2$ , is also statistically acceptable and confirms that the aforementioned variables also explain the current year's imports by a ratio of (58%) and the remainder (42%) is due to the influence of other factors outside the model. The model passed the overall morale test that the value (F) calculated was excessive (8.02) greater than its tabular value (4.1) at  $V_2 = 10$ ,  $V_1 = 2$  and morale level% 5, and indicate test (t-test) in the sense of a parameter (et-1)) estimated to be the value (t) calculated to be excessive (3.7) greater than the tabular value (1.8) at a degree of freedom (10) and a morale level of 5%, while Mt-1) statistically immoral that the calculated value (t) of 1.5 is lower than the aforementioned tabular value at the degree of freedom and the level of morale itself.

**B. Measuring the impact of total revenues on inflation rate, the model takes the following description:**

$$P_t = f (M_t ) \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

The above model examines the impact of non-compliance with U.S. sanctions on the Iraqi economy, reflected in the continued import from Iran and the impact on inflation. Before estimating the relationship above, the unit root test must be conducted to determine the stability of time chains, as the results of Dickie Fuller's expanded test indicate (ADF) Time chains of economic variables (Pt) have stabilized at the level, with a definite presence and at a moral level (% 0.5), so we reject the H0 hypothesis that indicates the lack of stability of time chains and accept the H1 hypothesis that suggests otherwise. Total imports (Mt) were found to have not stabilized at the level and morale level (% 5). Therefore, the unit root test was carried out in the first teams of the original series, where it was stable at the morale level (% 5) and with a definite presence.

With regard to the analysis of the results of the self-degradation model (VAR), searchers for the optimal slowing period of the estimated model prior to an estimate (VAR), since the optimal slowing period was one time period (one time gap) depending on the criteria (LR, FPE, AIC, SC, HQ), which is the minimum time for this The estimated relationship between total income and inflation rate after the optimal slowing period was:

$$P_t = -8.8 + 0.7 P_{t-1} + 2.8 M_{t-1} \dots\dots\dots(4)$$

$$t = (8.8) \quad (3.8) \quad (1.2)$$

$$R^2 = 0.64 \quad , R^2 \text{ adj} = 0.56$$

$$F^* = 7.9$$

The above model shows that the inflation rate increased in the previous year Pt-1 (1 unit likely to increase the current year's inflation rate by 0.7) (With the stability of other factors), this is consistent with the operative of economic theory since increasing the overall level of prices leads to higher costs of living and is likely to lead to a further increase in the overall level of prices, and that increasing total imports lagging behind in time (Mt-1) by one unit that increases the overall level of prices in the current year by 2.8 because Iraq relies heavily on imports and therefore can import inflation through imports, The interpretive power of R to the 2 indicates that both the rate of underdeveloped inflation, Total time-lag income affects the current year's inflation rate by 65% means that the independent variables (Pt-1, Mt-1) affects the dependent variable inflation rate by 65%) The remaining 35% is due to a number of other factors that have not entered the estimated model. The value of the R to 2 modulator, which is more accurate than R to the 2, is also statistically acceptable and confirms that the aforementioned variables also explain the current year's inflation rate by 56% and the remainder (44%) is due to the influence of other factors outside the model. The model passed the overall morale test that the value (F) calculated was excessive (7.3) greater than its tabular value (4.1) at V2 = 10, V1 = 2 and morale level% 5, and indicate test (t-test) in the sense of the Pt-1 parameter) estimated that the value of

(t) calculated to be excessive ((3.8 greater than the tabular value (1.8) at a degree of freedom (10) and a 5% morale level, while Mt-1) statistically inconsistent that the calculated value (t) of 1.2 is lower than the aforementioned tabular value at the degree of freedom and the level of morale itself.

**B. Adherence to US sanctions on Iran:**

In this aspect of the study, we will assume Iraq's adherence to U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran by boycotting Iranian goods[6]. The impact of Iraq's adherence to sanctions imposed on Iran can be measured by subtracting imports from Iran from its total import to show the impact of Iranian goods on Iraqi dinar exchange rate and inflation through two measurement models:

**C. Measuring the impact of total non-import imports from Iran on the exchange rate of Iraqi dinars. The model takes the following description:**

$$et = f(mt) \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

The above model examines Iranian-Iraqi economic relations expressed in imports without dealing with Iran (mt) and its impact on the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar in the parallel market. Before estimating the relationship above, the unit root test was conducted to determine the stability of time chains, and the results of Dickie Fuller's expanded test indicate (ADF) The time chains of economic variables (mt, et) have not all stabilized at the same level, as the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar has stabilized at the level and flatly at the morale level (0.5%), while total imports without Iran (mt) were found to have not stabilized at the level and morale level (% 5) Therefore, the unit root test was conducted in the first teams of the original series where it was stable at a level of morale (% 5) and with a definite presence.

With regard to the analysis of the results of the self-degradation model (VAR), searchers for the optimal slowing period of the estimated model prior to an estimate (VAR) were investigated as the optimal slowing period was one time period (one time gap) depending on the LR criterion, which corresponds to the lowest value of this criterion. The estimated relationship between total non-Iranian imports and the Iraqi dinar exchange rate after the optimal slowing period was:

$$et = 374.3 + 0.7 et_{-1} + 1.4 Mt_{-1} \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

$$t = (1.6) \quad (3.8) \quad (1.2)$$

$$R^2 = 0.64 \quad , R^2 \text{ adj} = 0.55$$

$$F^* = 7.1$$

The above model shows that the increase in the exchange rate of the previous year's Iraqi dinar (et-1) (1 unit likely to increase the current year's Iraqi dinar exchange rate by 0.7) (With the stability of other factors), the increase in the rate of exchange of the Iraqi dinar in the previous year is likely to continue in effect for the current year if the reasons for the increase in foreign currency demand continue, and the increase of total imports without the time lag Iran (mt-1) by a single unit that leads to an increase in the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar in the current year by (0.7) Because the imports need foreign currency to cover them and therefore the demand for this currency increases, resulting in higher exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar, but the demand for the currency will be lower than if the import from Iran continues, which will have less impact on the

higher exchange rate of the IraQdinar, The explanatory power of  $R^2$  indicates that both the time-lag Iraqi dinar exchange rate and total imports without a time-lag Iran affect the current year's Iraqi dinar exchange rate by 64% means that independent variables ( $mt_{-1}$ ,  $et_{-1}$ ) affects the dependent variable of imports by 64%) and the remainder 36%) is due to a number of other factors that did not enter the estimated model. The value of the  $R^2$  modulator, which is more accurate than the  $R$  to the 2, is also statistically acceptable and confirms that the aforementioned variables also explain the current year's imports by a ratio of (55%) and the remainder (45%) is due to the influence of other factors outside the model. The model passed the overall morale test that the value (F) calculated was excessive (7.1) greater than its tabular value (4.1) at  $V2 = 10$ ,  $V1 = 2$  and morale level% 5, and indicate test (t-test) in the sense of a parameter ( $et_{-1}$ ) estimated to be the value (t) calculated to be excessive (3.8) Greater than the tabular value (1.8) at a degree of freedom (10) and a 5% morale level, while  $mt_{-1}$  statistically immoral that the calculated value (t) of 1.2 is lower than the aforementioned tabular value at the degree of freedom and the level of morale itself.

**D. Measuring the impact of total income without income from Iran on the inflation rate, the model takes the following description:**

$$Pt = f (mt ) \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

The above model examines the impact of adherence to U.S. sanctions on the Iraqi economy, expressed by the subtraction of imports from Iran from total imports and its impact on the inflation rate. Before estimating the relationship above, the unit root test was conducted to determine the stability of time chains, as the results of Dickie Fuller's expanded test indicate (ADF) Time chains of economic variables (Pt) have stabilized at the level, with a definite presence and at a moral level (0.5%), total imports without imports from Iran (mt) were found to have not stabilized at the level and morale level (% 5) Therefore, the unit root test was conducted in the first teams of the original series where it was stable at a level of morale (% 5) and with a definite presence.

With regard to the analysis of the results of the self-degradation model (VAR), searchers for the optimal slowing period of the estimated model prior to an estimate (VAR) were investigated as the optimal slowing period was one time period (one time gap) depending on the LR criterion, which corresponds to the lowest value of these criteria. The estimated relationship between total imports from Iran and the inflation rate after the optimal slowing period was:

$$\log Pt = -22.3 + 1.3 \log Pt_{-1} + 1.3 \log mt_{-1} \dots\dots\dots(4)$$

$$t = \quad (1.6) \quad (3.4) \quad (1.6)$$

$$R^2 = 0.72 \quad , R^2 \text{ adj} = 0.62$$

$$F^* = 7.6$$

The above model shows that the inflation rate increased in the previous year  $\log Pt-1$  (1 unit likely to increase the current year's inflation rate by 1.3) (With the stability of other factors), this is consistent with the operative of economic theory since increasing the overall level of prices leads to higher living costs and is likely to lead to a further increase in the overall level of prices, and that increasing total imports without importing from time-lag Iran ( $\log mt-1$ ) by one unit increases the overall price level in the current year by 1.3 because Iraq is heavily dependent on imports and therefore can import inflation through imports but less than if it continues to import from Iran, The interpretive power of R to the 2 indicates that both the rate of underdeveloped inflation, Total non-import revenues from underdeveloped Iran affect the current year's inflation rate by 72% means that independent variables ( $\log Pt-1$ ,  $\log mt-1$ ) affects the dependent variable inflation rate by 72%) The remaining 28% is due to a number of other factors that did not enter the estimated model. The value of the R to 2 modulator, which is more accurate than R to the 2, is also statistically acceptable and confirms that the aforementioned variables also explain the current year's inflation rate by 62% and the remainder (38%) is due to the influence of other factors outside the model. The model passed the overall morale test of the F value calculated at 7.6 Greater than its tabular value (4.1) at  $V2 = 10$ ,  $V1 = 2$  and 5% morale level, and test indication (t-test) in the morale of  $\log Pt-1$  parameter) estimated to be the value of (t) calculated to be excessive ((3.4 greater than the tabular value (1.8) at a degree of freedom (10) and a 5% morale level, while  $\log mt-1$ ) statistically immoral that t is calculated at 1.6 below the aforementioned tabular value at the degree of freedom and the level of morale itself.

### **3<sup>th</sup>. The role of the resistant economy in addressing the effects of America's sanctions on Iran on the Iraqi economy**

The Resistance Economics Theory is one of the new theories put forward by the guide of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Imam Khamenei as one of the effective solutions to the difficult economic problems in which the economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran flops.

A resistant economy is a way of dealing with sanctions against a country or region in cases where imports and exports are not allowed (US Sanctions on Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

A resilient economy is one that can withstand the shocks of the economy. Such an economy must be flexible in different situations and able to overcome the crisis. An economy of resistance means the emergence of a situation in the economy that is stable in the face of internal and external obstacles and problems, and continues to grow and progress towards its noble goals (Bidar, 2022).

Economics of resistance is an internal type of economic development. Because they are self-sufficient, independent and stable, at the same time they take a long time, and at first they are associated with greater cost and risk. This kind of authority, because of its resistance to colonial and exploitative schemes for foreigners, is a conscious, wise, rational and spiritual economy, which emphasizes the cause of justice, ethics, knowledge and national capital, as well as reliance



on two elements. The inseparable part of the economy, national production and consumption alone, provides the possibility of coexistence between conflicting economic demands.

The policy of the resilient economy is derived from the culture of Islamism and science. It is a long-term measure of the country's economy. The objectives of the Islamic regime in the field of economic matters are achieved and the economy is prevented from deteriorating in the face of various shocks.

### **1. Elements of a resistant economy**

The Leader of the Islamic Revolution reviewed the 10 components of the resilient economy plan as follows:

- E. The first is to create mobility and vitality in the country's economy and improve overall economic indicators. He added that, while implementing the broad outlines of a resilient economy such as economic growth, national production, social justice and job creation, inflation will decrease, public welfare will improve and economic prosperity will be achieved.
- F. The second element is resilience to factors that can pose a threat. Such capacities included the vast scientific, human, natural, financial, geographical and climatic capacities that should be relied upon to implement such policies.
- G. The third element was the reliance on internal capacities. Dependence on internal capacities did not mean disregarding the potential of other States. The Islamic regime, along with its reliance on internal energies, also benefited from the potential of other States.
- H. The fourth element is the jihadist approach to the resilient economy plan. Because jihad, resistance and stability is a sacred and meaningful dual effort that monitors handling impediments and removing impediments with valuable motivations.
- I. The fifth element is to rely on the people at the centre and added that, based on Islamic and religious knowledge as well as on the experience of the last 35 years, divine care has included matters and the realization has progressed to the imam in any arena where the people entered.

The economy of resistance is not based on the State, not on the State, but on the people's economy. To say that the resistance economy is not the State's does not mean that the State is not responsible for it. Instead, the government has different responsibilities towards it. It is the Government's responsibility to plan, lay the groundwork, build capacity, guide and assist. But economic action and mainstream economic activity are in the hands of the people, the economy that is resistant is the people's economy, but the government, as a public official, oversees, directs and helps. Stop people wherever they want to abuse and participate in economic corruption; Helps those who need help. It is therefore the Government's duty to prepare for the situation.

- J. The sixth component of the resilient economy is to provide security and self-sufficiency for strategic goods, especially food and medicines.

- K. The seventh element is to reduce reliance on oil revenues.
- L. The eighth element of the plan is to modify the pattern of consumption, stressing that those responsible will avoid profligacy and serious waste in the scope of their tasks and thus in their personal life. He explained that the commitment of those responsible not to extravagance will lead to the promotion of this spirit in society.
- M. The ninth element of the plan was the fight against corruption. The necessity for sound economic activities was economic security, which in turn needed to address economic spoilers and law-abiding persons.
- N. The tenth and final element is the focus of science, and I emphasize that the country's circumstances today in terms of scientific progress are such that we can make access to a science-based economy one of our goals. A resistant economy uses scientific progress and depends on it. Relying on scientific progress is not about ignoring the elements of a craftsman's or a farmer's experience who has done great things based on experience over the years. These experiments are science in themselves and play a very important role [8].

## **2. Proposed scenario for resolving the impact of Iranian sanctions on Iraq through the following: -**

With the aim of ensuring mobile growth, improving economic resistance indicators, and achieving the objectives of the Ten-Year Horizon Charter, public policies of the resilient economy are informed in a jihadist, flexible, opportunity-maker, producer, self-flowing, leading and external aspirations:

- A. Ensuring conditions and revitalizing all possibilities and financial sources and human and scientific assets of the country in order to develop the production of jobs, and increasing the participation of all members of society in economic activities to the highest levels by facilitating and encouraging collective cooperation cases and emphasizing the raising of income and the role of the classes with low and medium incomes.
- O. Emphasizing the centrality of interest development in the economy by strengthening factors of production, enhancing manpower and enshrining the possibilities of economic competitiveness, providing a platform for competition between regions and governorates, and employing various possibilities and possibilities in the geography of the advantages of the country's regions.
- P. Increasing internal production of essential goods and materials (especially imported goods), prioritizing the production of strategic products and services, and creating a diversity of sources of insurance for imported goods with a view to reducing dependence on limited private countries.
- Q. Ensuring food and therapeutic security, and creating strategic reserves to emphasize the quantitative and qualitative increase of production (raw materials and goods).
- R. Managing consumption by emphasizing the application of public policies to reform the consumption model and promote consumption of internal goods as well as programming to raise quality and competitiveness in production.

- S. Comprehensive reform and strengthening of the country's financial system with the aim of responding to the needs of the national economy, providing stability in it, and leading the promotion of the realistic sector and comprehensive and targeted support for the export of goods and services commensurate with added value, and positive returns from hard currency, through:
- Facilitating decisions, laws and the development of necessary encouragements.
  - Development of foreign trade services, transit and infrastructure.
  - Promotion of external investment in exports.
  - Programming for national production commensurate with export requirements, formation of new markets and sectoral diversification in economic relations with other countries, especially those of the region.
  - The use of heterogeneous exchange mechanisms to facilitate exchanges if necessary.
  - Provide stability in export contexts and decisions with a view to the sustained development of Iran's share in the foreseeable markets.
  - Development of the areas of operation of special free economic zones, with the aim of transferring sophisticated technology, developing and facilitating production, facilitating the export of goods and services, and securing the necessary needs and financial sources from abroad.
  - Increasing the country's strategic oil and gas reserves in order to influence the global oil and gas markets, and emphasizing the conservation and development of oil and gas production capabilities, especially in common fields.
  -

### **CONCLUSIONS**

1. Imports provide most of Iraq's requirements for final and intermediate goods. Therefore, various external shocks will have negative economic returns, especially since Iraq lacks a broad, diversified and robust production base that adequately provides for its needs and various goods.
2. The majority of Iraqi imports tend to be consumer-oriented, so Iraq relies on nearby countries to reduce the cost by increasing the proportion of commodity imports for the period in question to total imports compared to oil imports.
3. The indiscriminate reliance on imports in the absence of real laws and controls governing imports and the absence of the control role of the Central Measurement and Quality Control Agency led to the flooding of the Iraqi market with cheap goods and goods that do not meet the most basic sanitary conditions and durability specifications. The biggest loser was the Iraqi citizen.
4. Trade between Iraq and Iran is unequal because it is imported only unilaterally, meaning that Iraq has become a net importer of Iran.
5. The persistent trade balance deficit reflects the higher value of Iraq's imports than its exports to Iran (resident at local official prices) which means that the Iraqi economy relies heavily on Iran to import to meet domestic market demand, benefiting from the advantage of

geographical proximity reflected in lower transport costs between the two countries, resulting in positive effects of lower prices for goods and services going from and to the two countries.

6. The domestic product is weak than the foreign product's comparable competition in terms of quality and price, as weak mechanisms for the application of the curfew duty on imported goods have led to frustration among local producers and undermined local manufacturing initiatives.
7. In the event of Iraq's commitment to apply sanctions against Iran, the Iraqi Government will need a lot of time and money to compensate for trade with Iran through the rehabilitation of border crossings and the paving of roads with neighbouring countries, which has a negative impact on the Iraqi citizen.
8. Statistical estimates indicate that there is a direct impact between imports and the exchange rate. Results have shown that the time lag exchange rate has a greater impact in case of non-compliance with U.S. sanctions on Iran, while the effect of imports on the exchange rate is lower in case of sanctions. In contrast, the impact of imports on underdeveloped inflation was greater if sanctions were observed, meaning that Iraq was importing inflation from Iran.

### **Recommendations**

1. Maintaining the growth and stability of Iraq's economy through a shift to a development strategy in targeting the development of non-oil exports.
2. Work to revitalize the industrial sector and its rise needs a package of policies, including support and stimulation of the private sector, provision of infrastructure, appropriate tax policies, and other government measures.
3. Develop the agricultural sector by pursuing policies similar to the requirements of the industrial sector, as well as re-engineering the country's water policy to ensure the needs of the agricultural sector and other requirements.
4. Regulate the import process (develop an import plan) and reduce the phenomenon of commercial exposure.
5. The protection of domestic products through the activation and implementation of the Protection of Domestic Products Act, the activation of the Competition and Anti-Savings Act and the activation of article 2 of the Ministry of Commerce Act No. 37 of 2011, which provides for the formulation of trade and domestic policy in line with the State's general economic policies.
6. Optimal utilization of available material and human resources and satisfaction of local needs rather than dependence on import Domestic and foreign direct investment provides financial resources in addition to advanced technology and contributes to opening new markets by linking domestic production to the need of foreign markets, improving the balance of payments, reducing the impact and benefits of external debt, increasing export potential, enhancing competitiveness in foreign markets and supporting economic relations between Iraq and the recipient countries. Foreign investment encourages domestic investment by

creating new investment opportunities in leading industries, as well as foreign investment stimulates domestic investment during the effects of industrial linkages, buying domestic inputs, and foreign investment will expand growth opportunities by creating new jobs and increasing jobs. (If the production technology is commensurate with the nature of the local labour market as well as the quality) Since the oil sector is at the forefront of all sectors in attracting investments and in influencing the growth process, investment is the best way to improve Iraq's economy. This can be achieved through concerted efforts, concerted and integrated potential and effective participation between the government and private sectors, This requires a clear or specific economic management and coordination between the various State bodies responsible for the formulation and implementation of economic policies.

7. Managing economic risks by preparing smart, effective, quick and timely feedback projects on risks and internal and external imbalances Work on transparency and flexibility of the distribution system, set prices and modernize market supervision methods.
8. Increase quality coverage and promotion of all internal products.

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